

[H.A.S.C. No. 110-93]

**THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD  
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## **THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, October 4, 2007.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:06 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. Good morning. Good work there, Dr. Gingrey, Mr. Conaway.

Good morning. We appreciate you all being here with us. This is the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation. We are continuing our look at the Department of Defense's role in the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Several departments and agencies are involved in the PRT program besides Department of Defense (DOD), including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture.

While we may choose to examine the role of the other departments and agencies at a later hearing, our witnesses today are DOD witnesses.

By the PRT's very nature, DOD plays a unique and critical role. Until PRTs work themselves out of a job, that is, until the security situation permits the replacement of the PRTs with more traditional diplomatic and developmental assistance efforts, DOD will be at the forefront of this effort.

While every PRT is unique, depending on the security situation on the ground and the maturity of developmental needs of the province in which they operate, there are three basic kinds of PRTs—the Afghanistan PRTs and, in Iraq, the primary PRTs and the embedded PRTs, and I would ask that our witnesses take advantage of any opportunities to amplify on the differences between these kinds of PRTs and the pros and cons of the various models that have been used.

We are also interested in learning how the PRTs are affected when security responsibility is transitioned to the host governments or when we are planning on that transition when forward operating bases are closed or when maneuver troops are withdrawn from the area.

This subcommittee has heard testimony that in Iraq, where provinces have transitioned to provincial Iraqi control, PRTs have been unable to operate.

We chose the PRT topic both because PRTs are critical to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and because we think they represent a case study on how the interagency process works or doesn't work in Washington and in the field.

And we are joined today by a good panel of witnesses. Mr. Mitchell Shivers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia Affairs; Major General Bobby Wilkes, United States Air Force, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs-Asia, Strategic Plans and Policy, with the Joint Staff; Mr. Mark Kimmitt, Brigadier General (Retired), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and, Colonel Ralph Baker, Deputy Director of the Politico-Military Affairs-Middle East, Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff.

We appreciate you all being here.

Before we begin with your testimony, we will hear from Mr. Akin for any statement he wants to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning and thank you all for joining us here this morning.

Today's hearing is this subcommittee's second public hearing on the role of Department of Defense in provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

A lot of people around here think that problems in Iraq need to be solved in Baghdad or in Washington, D.C. My view is that the solution rests in the local provinces, with local people putting the solutions together and solving their problems.

If we take a look at how America was built, it is clear that it wasn't built by starting in Washington, D.C. Our country was built by little towns and communities coming together, 13 states in all.

So I am not surprised that it appears our greatest successes are happening at the local level in Iraq.

As I previously stated, PRTs and the subject of stabilization operations generally is critical to transforming a local area from a combat zone to a business development zone or a quiet residential neighborhood.

In my view, sufficient troop strength combined with increasing the number of PRTs has had a significant positive effect on building local communities.

Another aspect of the PRTs which I am interested in is the interagency composition of the teams. We often hear that Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom require all elements of national power, though I think it has been the exception and not the rule when this has happened.

We have heard from former PRT members and how PRTs operate on the ground and how interagency issues are resolved in theater. I am curious how the interagency in Washington works to sup-

port the PRTs. In particular, I would like our witnesses to comment on the department's role in shaping PRT policy and resolving PRT issues in the daily Afghanistan operations group meetings and in the weekly Iraq steering group meetings.

Finally, I would like to understand how the department's implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05, military support for stability, security transition and reconciliation operations, is informed by DOD's work on PRTs.

It seems to me that PRTs are the best tangible example of stabilization operation that the SSTR directive contemplates. I would like our witnesses to explain how the department's policy arm is connecting the directive to the PRTs.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here and I know all of us look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

Gentlemen, your written statements will be made a part of the record, but we want you to take as much time as you need to talk with us this morning.

We will put the five-minute clock on for you, but when it goes to red, if you need to talk more, you talk more. That is more just to give you an idea where time is at.

For the committee members' information, we will follow our five-minute rule reasonably strictly here this morning. That means we will probably get around the group of us more than once.

You all might be interested to know, and you may already know this, but both the staff and the members have met in private briefings in this room with members of PRTs that have come back both from Afghanistan and from Iraq.

We have also met with DOD civilians, not necessarily PRT members, but DOD civilians who have had problems after they were wounded from combat injuries because of their civilian status rather than military status.

So there is a series of issue we are looking at. Primarily, this morning, we are interested in this issue of interagency, how it works or doesn't work, but any comments that you might want to make on how you think—if you see any problems or are aware of any problems with how our civilian component is treated under our laws and regulations as members of these PRTs compared to our military folks, as far as benefits or incentives or if they are wounded. Any thoughts you might have about that, we would be glad to hear of, also.

Let's start with you, Mr. Shivers, and then we will just go right down to General Wilkes, Mr. Kimmitt and Colonel Baker.

Mr. Shivers.

**STATEMENT OF MITCHELL E. SHIVERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CENTRAL ASIA**

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, good morning. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Defense's role in provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs, in Afghanistan.

PRTs have matured since November 2002 from a single U.S.-led pilot project in Gardez to a fully international effort involving 25 teams in the majority of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

PRTs now represent a major element of the mission to expand the reach of the Afghan government throughout the country. While the effectiveness of individual PRTs is sometimes uneven, the overall PRT effort is achieving noteworthy results and requires sustained support.

The role of PRTs was formally agreed to on January 27, 2005 by the PRT executive steering committee, the international political-military body responsible for PRT direction and guidance, and the following mission statement.

Provincial reconstruction teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts.

Of the 25 existing PRTs, 12 are led by the United States. The military component of a U.S. PRT is commanded by a uniformed officer is task organized to accomplish the following functions: operations, administration, logistics, security and a variety of enabling roles, including civil affairs and engineering.

Each U.S.-led PRT has approximately 100 military personnel, though this number varies considerably.

The PRT commander coordinates PRT activities with representatives from other parts of the U.S. interagency. In most instances, this includes representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture.

In addition to the resources and expertise leveraged by the interagency PRT members, the PRT commander has at his or her disposal Commander's Emergency Response Program, (CERP), funds, which are used to address urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs.

CERP remains one of our commander's most effective tools in helping ordinary Afghans seek positive changes in their daily lives.

PRTs in Afghanistan all fall under the broad authority of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), although several other organizations have been established to help ensure unity of effort among various stakeholders.

The most important example, the PRT executive steering committee, provides high level policy direction and includes the Afghan minister of interior, the ISAF commander, the United Nations special representative of the secretary general, NATO senior civilian representative, the EU special representative, and ambassadors of all PRT troop-contributing nations.

NATO reports that as of July 2007, PRTs have completed over 9,000 projects in all development sectors. While this achievement is notable, it is more useful to focus on less quantifiable aspects of what PRTs do.

First, PRTs act as small embassies for the various reconstruction efforts being undertaken by the Afghan government, military forces, aid agencies and nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan. They also provide a mechanism for mentoring officials of Afghanistan's ministries at the provincial level.

Further, PRTs serve as a vehicle for aligning the priorities set out in the Afghanistan national development strategy, the ANDS, the overarching strategic document for long-term development in Afghanistan.

Importantly, PRTs reinforce the international community's commitment to the people of Afghanistan. Although the overall PRT construct is an effective and necessary component of the mission in Afghanistan, the PRT effort faces many challenges. By nature, PRTs are civil-military entities and, therefore, demand close coordination between the various interagency contributors.

As such, PRTs are highly dependent on the leadership skills and teamwork abilities of the PRT commander and his or her interagency colleagues.

Additionally, because PRTs fall under NATO direction, extensive coordination and consensus between allies is required to foster unity of effort. Last, different countries inherently have different capabilities and resources at their disposal and some must rely on other more capable allies for assistance in establishing and operating PRTs.

In considering the role of PRTs in Afghanistan, it is necessary to place them in the appropriate context. The international community, in partnership with the Afghan government, is undertaking one of the most ambitious stabilization and reconstruction efforts in history. PRTs play a crucial role in that effort.

We jointly are extending the reach of a government and a nation that has endured decades of war and nearly complete destruction of its infrastructure, economy and political institutions.

We are making progress, but ultimate success will take many years and will demand sustained interest and commitment of the United States and the international community.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shivers can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Shivers.  
General Wilkes.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. BOBBY J. WILKES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (ASIA), U.S. AIR FORCE**

General WILKES. Good morning, sir. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify this morning on the military role of the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. General Wilkes, if you would just hold for a minute.

For the members, we received General Wilkes' statement this morning. So you may not have gotten it in your office, but it is in your packet.

Go ahead, General Wilkes.

General WILKES. In order to accelerate development of Afghanistan, the U.S. military, in 2002, created provincial reconstruction teams to integrate U.S. military, U.S. interagency and host nation government officials.

Initially, the U.S. Government listed three goals for the PRTs—establish security, extend the reach of the Afghan government into the provinces, and assist reconstruction.

The number of teams expanded from three in 2003 to 25 today. The United States military leads 12, and coalition nations lead 13.

PRTs are increasingly more important and contribute significantly to Afghanistan's progress. For the international security and assistance force, the PRT is now the principal vehicle to leverage the international community in Afghan government reconstruction and development programs.

The recent U.S. strategic review of Afghanistan recognized the need to increase the resiliency of the Afghan government against the insurgency, strengthen the U.S. Government counterinsurgency efforts, and speed up development.

Many counterinsurgency experts agree that effective interagency cooperation establishes the conditions for successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency. The PRT serves as the principal vehicle for coordinating the U.S. and Afghan efforts to securing common goals in Afghanistan.

The American-led PRTs fall under the command of Combined Joint Task Force 82 (JTF-82) as overall national command element lead for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.

CJTF-82 coordinates PRT operations with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters and the U.S. embassy for policy guidance. All efforts are in support of the Afghan national development strategy.

PRT projects are funded with commanders' emergency response program funds and with U.S. Agency for International Development funds and execution is synchronized at subordinate CJTF-82 command levels.

A U.S.-led PRT consists of approximately 85 American military members, three American civilians and five Afghans. The commanding officer of a PRT and his interagency team are responsible for advising local Afghan government officials, coordinating international community reconstruction efforts, and facilitating local government efforts.

Two civil affairs teams and an engineer advisory team coordinate development and capacity-building activities directly with local officials, tribal elders, private contractors, United States Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organization (NGOs).

A military police team coordinates the training and actions of the Afghan national police. The military component also includes a system operations (SYOPS) unit, bomb disposal team, intelligence team, medics, an administration and support section, and a force protection platoon to facilitate freedom of movement throughout their area of responsibility.

Normally located with the PRTs are three U.S. civilian personnel from State Department, USAID and the Department of Agriculture, and one Afghan government official from the ministry of interior.

The State Department's foreign service officer serves as a political advisor to the PRT commander and the Afghan provincial governor. The USAID field program officer advises on development work. The Department of Agriculture employee advises the PRT on agricultural development issues and the Afghan ministry of interior

official provides advice on local political dynamics and facilitates intelligence collection.

PRT is trained as a team at Fort Bragg, North Carolina before they deploy. The training includes the participation of U.S. Government officials from the State Department, AID and USDA.

The most recent training in the winter of 2006 included participation by Afghans. This invaluable team training includes weapons handling, convoy operations, cultural awareness and theater immersion.

In addition to supporting the Afghan national development strategy, PRTs are a key enabler of the counterinsurgency strategy, that is, separating the enemy from the populous, connecting the government with the people, and transforming the environment at the sub-national level.

The U.S. PRT in the Panjshir Valley is an excellent example of success. Strong cooperation between ground forces, the local government and the local populous enabled the completion of approximately 90 projects.

Coordinating additional road construction and a wind farm, coupled with other USAID projects, resulted in a district center with electricity and many market opportunities.

The activities of the PRT are setting the conditions that bring more local support to the central government, further separating the local population from the insurgency and continuing to transform the lives of the Afghan people.

The PRT is the entity to facilitate progress and ensure both the counterinsurgency and national development efforts are complementary and ultimately successful.

Our goal for the future is for the reach of the Afghan central government to expand into the provinces and districts. With improved security conditions and an increasing local government capacity, the PRT role and functions will reflect the changing environment and accommodate increasing Afghan government capability.

As we look to the future, perhaps the biggest challenge in fielding PRTs will be finding well qualified, experienced people to serve as team members. Although PRTs are not exclusively a military project or program, the initial reliance on DOD personnel to staff PRTs is not surprising.

DOD is the only department of government that currently has the capacity to surge. The State Department and other agencies can hire additional personnel over time and are doing so. However, the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well, is that our nation will be well served if there exists a surge capacity in the nonmilitary skill sets that are so important in the kinds of conflicts we have been engaged in since the early 1990's.

We must build additional civilian capacity to participate in these efforts. It is vitally important that we increase the capabilities within civilian agencies, a reserve of civilian experts, civil engineers, retired local government officials, business executives, water and sewer managers, comptrollers, public health administrators and the like to provide a rapid response capability the Nation lacks today.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Wilkes can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Wilkes.  
General Kimmitt.

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MARK T. KIMMITT, (RET.), DEPUTY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MIDDLE EAST)**

General KIMMITT. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today on the subject of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq.

They are different than the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, have a different function, have a different role, and are achieving effects.

Their mission is to assist Iraq's provincial and local governments with developing a transparency and sustained capability to govern by promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

PRTs do this, in large part, by establishing and strengthening relationships with local leaders and local governments, business community and elected officials. They are improving governance capabilities by teaching technical, managerial and fiscal skills that enable local government officials to provide essential services and other key development projects to the Iraqi people.

The result is a growing self-reliance at the local and provincial government levels. You have heard the term "bottom-up progress." In fact, PRTs are at the forefront of this.

As you know, the State Department has the lead for PRTs in Iraq, but they truly are an interagency effort and we see a significant DOD responsibility for their success.

We have State Department foreign service officers, Department of Defense civil affairs officers, engineer officers, USAID project leaders, Department of Justice rule of law experts Department of Agriculture development specialists, working together alongside military units to achieve results in those communities.

As you know, there are ten pre-surge PRTs, 15 embedded PRTs, and five provincial support teams on the ground in Iraq and we can clarify the difference between each of those in the question-and-answer period.

The original five PRTs were established in 2005 and 2006 and focused primarily on the provincial government level. Seven of the ten are led by the United States, while three are led by our coalition partners from Great Britain, Italy and Korea.

As part of the President's 2007 new way forward strategy, we were directed to increase the number of PRTs. These 15 additional PRTs, embedded PRTs, work side by side, embedded into our brigade combat teams and focus on district and local level governance.

The five provincial support teams, comprised of one or two members, serve in areas where there is not a major presence of U.S. forces.

Although the Department of State has the lead for PRTs, DOD, due to its surge capability, provided personnel on an interim basis to expedite standing up what we call the new way forward EPRTs.

Our experience in this demonstrates the need for civilian reserve capability, as it is important we increase these capabilities, as was noted by General Wilkes, within civilian agencies, to create and fund a civilian reserve to rapidly deploy and draw on outside experts in types of contingency operations when needed.

As to the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (EPRTs), they have only been in place for a few months, but early signs are highly encouraging and we are seeing extremely positive results. Over time, we hope to see increased capabilities from the Iraqis to govern themselves, because at the end of the day, the purpose of the PRTs are to put themselves out of business and hand this responsibility over to the people of Iraq.

Frankly, we see the EPRTs and all the PRTs inside of Iraq as a success story and that success was created by individuals from different agencies on the ground every day.

Mr. Akin's point we can discuss a little bit later in terms of whether this is better managed through better control from Washington, D.C. or if we should continue to allow these to evolve on the ground as we develop our doctrine.

With that, let me pass it over to Colonel Baker and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kimmitt can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Kimmitt.  
Colonel Baker.

**STATEMENT OF COL. RALPH O. BAKER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,  
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST), U.S. ARMY**

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin, members of the committee, thank you for your interest in our nation's security and the honor of testifying before you this morning.

I appreciate your support of the men and women of our armed forces who, around the world, often in very difficult and challenging environments, and far from home and family, are making a difference.

Our goal remains an Iraqi government that transitions to self-reliance, where all Iraqis unite against violence and perceive the government of Iraq as the legitimate authority to provide security, law and order, and basic services.

Provincial reconstruction teams are the front line civilian-military operators who serve a vital role in the campaign to stabilize Iraq with our coalition partners. They serve as the primary interface between U.S. and coalition partners and provincial and local governments throughout Iraq.

As part of the President's January new way forward strategy, the interagency, led by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, partnered in order to double the ten paired PRTs, so named because of their specific alignment with geographic provinces and whose principal focus is a provincial government.

The ten additional PRTs, integral to the President's new way forward, are embedded. Referred to as EPRTs, the principal focus is on district and local governments. These EPRTs work hand-in-glove with brigade combat teams or their Marine counterparts, regimental combat teams.

At the request of Secretary Rice, DOD agreed to provide some DOD personnel to expedite the standing up of the ten new way forward EPRTs and over the summer these teams were formed by personnel provided by DOD, State, USAID, Department of Justice, and the Department of Agriculture.

These teams have already begun to make a positive impact. For example, PRTs have been instrumental in developing local capacity to prioritize funds and manage projects. As a result of PRT technical assistance, provinces have obligated over \$1 billion worth of Iraqi-funded reconstruction projects, a significant achievement in a country with a history of central control.

Iraq now has provincial counsels, sitting together, debating the merits of various projects, developing budgets and letting contracts. This effort not only helps build local capacity for budget execution, but improves the democratic process as desperate interests compete for resources and parties negotiate to bargain to resolve complex problems.

Concurrent with the standup of ten EPRTs over the spring and summer, manning was authorized for the formation of an additional four new EPRTs at the request of General Odierno.

A fifth new EPRT team is also being assembled from manpower within theater. These five EPRTs are currently forming and will begin to function by the end of October, bringing the total of PRT/EPRTs to 25, ten paired and 15 EPRTs.

Throughout these processes, DOD has coordinated closely with the State Department and, in November, State will begin a phased replacement of the interim DOD personnel for the ten new way forward EPRTs, completely replacing them by March of 2008.

We attribute a large part of the success of PRTs to the versatility and skill sets tailored to the specific and unique challenges in their local environments. Additionally, embedded PRTs provide a unique benefit as a result of their integration with their host combat teams.

What we have learned is that the fusion of the PRT with the combat team helps coordinate and achieve objectives.

The strategic situation in Iraq will ultimately be solved by political means. To that end, PRTs play an integral role in advancing the political process from the local district and provincial level.

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you this morning. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Baker can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

Two members of this committee, Jeff Davis from Kentucky is not with us, and Susan Davis from California, are the head of a caucus here. What is the formal name, the interagency reform?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Working group.

Dr. SNYDER. It is a working group and it is probably more group than working right now. There is a lot of interest on this committee on the whole issue of interagency interactions and the impacts on both Afghanistan and Iraq.

If there is no objection, Mr. Akin, I am going to have Mrs. Davis take the first five minutes. Then we will go to you and then come back to me.

So, Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, because I am going to have to leave in a few minutes and hopefully come back.

But I appreciate very much you all being here. You are all individuals that we hope to look to and secure your brains, your experience, to understand this better. And our goal really is to educate the members, to have us be in a better position to really evaluate these issues and understand the extent to which the role that Congress can play a role or the extent to which we ought to just stay out of it. So that is really what we are trying to look at.

I have basically three questions and perhaps if you could, in some way, flesh these out quickly.

One is, how do we evaluate the PRTs? You mentioned the completion of projects. I guess I would look to the number of people in the area that are employed that weren't employed before the PRT gets there.

Are there some standardized ways that you can begin to evaluate that? Access to local power. How many people are involved after the PRTs have been in effect?

Then I guess the other real question is, how do we evaluate when they have been successful and when they should phase out? Are you establishing some—I don't want to use the word, "benchmarks" here, but are you establishing some guides for how we really truly evaluate that and how you can determine that, for one reason or another, they are really not being effective and what is it that is making them less effective than something else?

We know personalities play a role, a lot of dynamics environmentally within, one size doesn't fit all. We know that. But are we developing some real guidelines for looking at that?

How do you surge? How are you thinking about potential surge? How does this fit into overall national security plans as we are planning not just for tomorrow, but really 10 years out, 15 years out? What kind of training, what kind of mechanism needs to be in place?

And, finally, I think, Mr. Kimmitt, in talking briefly earlier, how do we reward the people who are part of this particularly in the services, in the military? How do you reward them for that time that they have spent and the experiences they have gained and impact that they have had in changing dynamics and how do we begin to really establish that so that that experience is as important as some other experience in promoting career opportunities?

Thank you.

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say that there isn't a one-size-fits-all standard series of metrics at this point for PRTs in Afghanistan.

There is a growing appreciation of the types of things that work and those things that don't work and there is certainly a lot of effort underway in terms of communicating lessons learned and creating standard organizations and things like that and opportunities for PRTs to communicate amongst each other the lessons that they are gaining as they operate.

Obviously, as you point out, Ma'am, there are a complex series of environmental factors to do with geography, to do with security

environment of the 25 PRTs in Afghanistan. There is a wide range of conditions that they operate within.

So I can assure you that local commanders, those that are responsible for the PRTs, have a series of metrics that they measure their staff against and in the reporting line, they do, as well, and there is a sincere attempt to get more faithful reporting of what is being achieved with this.

After all, these are quite expensive organizations to run and we have great hopes for their ability to achieve positive results on the ground.

So I think the standardized set of metrics is still somewhat elusive, but there is certainly an attempt to measure more faithfully and with greater fidelity what we are achieving there.

When you talk about rewards, I was heartened to see that a number of previous witness before this committee indicated that they did feel that their own particular personal service was rewarded thereafter and I know there is some effort both in the military and in the civilian sectors to recognize people that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and create career opportunities for them that demonstrate the country's appreciation for their service.

How systematic that is, again, I can't testify to that, but I know that is an important element and, indeed, when we are looking at employing people at OSD, we, for instance, heavily weight those people, give advantage to those people that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. Any other members, go ahead and respond.

General WILKES. If I may, from a personal perspective of how we take care of our people, I know that when we select the individuals to go on these PRTs, particularly in the command side of the house, they go through a screening process, just like we do our commanders at any other units.

And so there is only about 50 percent that really get through the command screening and are then selected. So, therefore, they are set up in the promotion process having already been recognized and screened as a commander.

And so when they come out of the other end, like Mr. Shivers said, they have that commander's stamp on their record and they are being reviewed for the next level of opportunity. And the personal rewards of being a part of that and serving in Afghanistan and Iraq I think are significant to folks and we do look on the staffs here to hire those kinds of people that have that experience.

So we are institutionalizing that, I think, as part of our promotion systems.

How to evaluate the PRTs and their effectiveness is a difficult issue. We don't have a standard set of metrics yet. They vary by each of the provinces and the regions that these PRTs operate in and it depends upon the needs of that region and the counterinsurgency that is being faced in that region.

In places where you have more stability and you go to less conflict, you can do more things in a little bit different fashion. Where you have an educated populous that is willing to take on some of the roles of government, it moves a whole lot faster and we see the varying differences just from border to border within the specific

regions within Afghanistan today, where we are more effective in different regions.

Where the insurgency progresses, it is a little bit harder for us, but over time, I would suggest that the measure is going to be where commerce and the freedom of the people rule and the government is able to take over and to maintain that territory with their given Afghanistan police forces.

We are seeing an effective use of our PRTs and, at that point in time, I think we can probably back out at least into the background and let the Afghan government start working it.

So that is kind of the measurement we are looking at.

General KIMMITT. Again, this partially goes to the question of the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. We used to joke about Afghanistan being a 14th century economy rushing headlong into the 15th.

And what the PRTs, I would suggest, in Afghanistan are doing are trying to build something that was never there, road networks, so on and so forth. By contrast, in Iraq, I went to our PRT handbook, which differentiates requirements, and it says, "There is a stronger emphasis in Iraq on capacity-building rather than reconstruction. Capacity is defined as coaching, mentoring and training in good governance and economics."

So to the extent that the PRTs in Iraq are measured by the success of the local government to be able to do their job, the ultimate effect that we are seeking is to put them out of a job.

We do not have PRTs in every province in Iraq. Two in particular, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah, are considered to have sufficient governance capability themselves that doesn't require U.S. insertion or coalition insertion into those provinces.

So going to the question, Ms. Davis, in regards of how are you going to know you are ultimately successful, it is when we close that PRT, PST or EPRT down, because the local people are doing the job for themselves.

Some of the metrics that can be used, I would suggest, would include their ability to get funds and obligate funds given to them from the Iraqi ministry of finance, their ability to run their own provincial health systems, their own provincial education systems.

And that is why each of the PRTs has a different focus, because as you might imagine, in each of those provinces, there is a different capacity already existing on the ground.

Some of the provinces have very developed health systems, particularly in the south. Others in the west don't necessarily have that. So that is where we put more emphasis.

But to your point on the metric, the ultimate metric is when there is no longer a need for that PRT.

Colonel BAKER. I would like to add just one final comment, ma'am, to your question and perhaps bring it down to more of a local level at the EPRT/Bridge Combat Team (BCT) level.

There are local metrics that commanders and team leaders use and some of them are as simple as numbers and types of projects that they contract, that they complete. Some are becoming more complex in terms of assessing budget execution, which Mr. Kimmitt was just alluding to.

But ultimately, we are trying to understand the effect that the PRT activities are having on the citizens in the province and many times it is difficult to be that objective.

You have to really be more subjective in your metrics. And so we found that certain things, like the reduction in levels of violence, were directly proportional many times to the process in terms of reconstruction and building, a targeting of improving essential services that the PRTs were instrumental in, so that you could graph and track that at the local level.

The number of unsolicited tips that the local citizens begin to provide the security forces begins to raise and many times that is because they—it is a quid pro quo society. They don't have anything to give back for what you do for them except information and that is really where the PRT and the counterinsurgency components begin to interact at the local level.

One of the things I talk about to groups is the wave factor. I don't know if you have ever heard of that. But when I was driving through a neighborhood and nobody waved at me, not a child, not a woman, not a man, I knew that there were some very serious and fundamental problems in that particular neighborhood.

When I drove through a neighborhood and the children waved, but the adults did not, things weren't rock bottom, but they weren't good either. And when you are driving through a neighborhood where everybody is waving to you, it tells you that you have begun to have an effect on that population. You have reduced the levels of violence.

They are sharing information with you. You have created some trust and confidence between you and the citizens and, probably more importantly, hope and expectations that these small accomplishments that we make in the local areas will allow the larger national accomplishments to take root over the long term and that gives us that space and that time we need to build that bridge from the bottom up and the top down for local and national accommodation and reconciliation.

So I hope that answers it somewhat.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick questions here.

The first thing, and maybe this is two separate answers relative to Afghanistan and Iraq, but let's say you have got a local military commander that has some money in his pocket so he can fix somebody's sewer or a pothole or whatever it happens to be, which we found to be very effective.

Now, who coordinates between the local military commander in an area and the PRTs what project is going to be done and how do you work that through? I assume it may be different in both.

Just a quick answer, because I have got a couple of other tougher questions. But just how does that work?

Mr. SHIVERS. Are you asking about the specific approval process?

Mr. AKIN. Yes, that cycle. Let's say that there is a water line out between here and there and the military commander in the area thinks, "Boy, we could build a lot of brownie points if we fix the water line" or something.

How do you work between the government, the PRT—I mean, the Afghan government, the PRT and the military commander in charge? What is that coordination process on various things that you are working on?

Mr. SHIVERS. Again, sir, it would depend on the operating environment that you find yourself in. If you are cooperating closely with Afghanistan government officials, that is, that they have a good functioning local government, then you would look for—depending upon where the recommendation came from, it could have come from a village elder, a local mullah, you would coordinate that with the mechanism at the PRT for liaison with the Afghan government, the local district or provincial government, village government.

There is a relatively formal system of approvals, as you might expect, because it is U.S. taxpayer money that is being expended and strict documentation that is attached to it, but it is applied fairly flexibly.

Anecdotally, I have never done a survey of the entire thing, but I do question returning officers, people who have been in command of PRTs, to ask them how flexible the system is and how quick they can get.

So there are a variety of different points of approval, but a lot of delegated approval, as well. So PRTs, for instance, have—

Mr. AKIN. Who makes the decision, though, the final decision of whether you are going to do something or does it depend?

General WILKES. There is kind of a hierarchy. Obviously, the development plan for Afghanistan is the lead list of directions. That goes into an embassy with the ambassador and a group of all the interagency, including the U.S. forces piece of it, that ties together with all the NATO pieces, and they look at the larger project lists of things.

Anything that is over about \$1 million or something or other is approved at that level. As you get down into the CJTF-82, anything below \$1 million, they would be the decision authority in that.

Mr. AKIN. Who would be the decision authority?

General WILKES. The CJTF commander. And as you get down into the brigade combat team, the commander there has the authority. And I am not talking that these guys are going to unilaterally be the final say on everything. They work with the interagency team.

They have project lists between that and about 50. When you get down to the 50,000 and below, your PRT commander has authority on those kinds of dollars and with his team there, he would execute that money.

General KIMMITT. A great question and that is exactly why we formed the EPRTs to put the brigade commander and the Department of State under the same tent, working together, both looking at the same campaign plan, both looking at the effects in their neighborhood to make this as simple as possible.

I will Ralph pass on the details of that.

Colonel BAKER. Sir, there are really two cases here. One is where you have an emergency essential service that you need to remedy

and then there is also the long-term project list that you want to plan over time to improve the quality of life.

What you will typically find is that, ultimately, the PRT team leader has responsibility for prioritizing and making the final call on those elements in the economic and the rebuilding area that have to be repaired.

However, it is a collaborative effort between the brigade commander and that team leader. They both have moneys. The commander has his CERP fund and the team leader has his quick reaction funds that can both be targeted at the same infrastructure requirements.

An so typically what you will find is the brigade combat team and the team will form their own committee that will essentially determine in their work plan all the different projects that they have to work on and what priority they have to work on them.

If they are smart, and many of them are, they will try to spend other people's money before they spend their own.

Mr. AKIN. Most of them are.

Colonel BAKER. For example, we used to take everything in our area that needed to be repaired, fixed or built and prioritize it and then we would bring in NGOs, we would bring in the Army Corps of Engineers, we would bring external contractors in and try to get them to take on those projects in our area so that we didn't have to spend and commit our moneys to those projects.

Then after we had bid everything out that we could, we would then focus our funds on those areas that we thought gave the citizens the most benefit and also benefited us from a coin standpoint.

General KIMMITT. But I think it is also important to note that by putting people in the same Foreign Operating Base (FOB), working side by side every day, living together, working together, eating together, talking together, you do get that synchronized view inside these embedded PRTs where it is not, "Well, we need to go over to Babil to talk to the PRT. We are over here in Wasit."

Putting them together in this embedded, it is starting to become very, very apparent to us the wisdom of that decision for them to have the same common situational awareness and the same desire to achieve the same effects in the same location, whether you are State Department, USAID or military, and things get worked out on the ground in a remarkable way that don't often do it when you have a lot of wiring diagrams and disparate locations.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. I am out of time.

What I was going to ask, and maybe come back around later, so don't answer this question, but you can think about it, is who is going to run basically—what we are seeing in this kind of a conflict, there is a need for whether it is a PRT or whatever you want to call it, but there is need for those kinds of teams.

I guess my question, and I think it is a question of other people on the committee maybe, is who ultimately should be running those things? Should that be something that is considered a DOD thing and we are actually going to budget for that and we are going to have a structure in the way that we do that?

Is that a State thing or how does that work? So that might be a politically dangerous question to answer, but we would be curious about your opinion on it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, if you want to respond to that, any comments that come to mind, if any of you want to respond to Mr. Akin.

General Wilkes.

Mr. Kimmitt.

General KIMMITT. To our view, it is pretty well laid out in NSPD-44, as well as DOD 3000.05, that there is an understanding that this is an interagency effort.

Where the rubber meets the road, of course, is in funding. The Department of Defense budget is roughly 20 to 25 times that of the Department of State. And so we always have to work our way through that.

But in many ways, we have the directive from the NSPD and, internal to our own department, DOD 3000.05 that talks about these types of stabilization.

We have a deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. She is responsible for putting together the policy within DOD for how we work with the State Department and other agencies.

I think that there is a significant desire on the part of all the agencies, the interagency, to come together to try to put into policy what we are finding is working so effectively in practice on the ground.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

I will take my five minutes now.

We met with, as I mentioned, both civilian and military members of the PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq and really came away with a sense of just really some remarkable people who care a great deal about what they do and felt like that their superiors cared a great deal about what they do.

I think one of them told us that before he went over, CNO, I think, the Chief of Naval Operations got them all together and said, here is the CNO saying, "What you are about to embark on is very, very important to this country," and that kind of thing sticks with you.

But I think they are a remarkable group of people. The question that we all have been wrestling with, and I mentioned to Jeff Davis before he came in, with this interagency stuff, do we have some inherent obstacles in the way things are set up that may interfere with that.

Mr. Kimmitt, let me just ask you one quick question before I get to my questions for today.

We heard testimony, as I am now going back to your former role in Iraq, but we had testimony a couple weeks ago from a representative of the Department of Labor, in public testimony, and I presented a scenario.

I said if I had a DOD civilian, of which you are now one, and he was assigned to Iraq and volunteered to go to Iraq or ended up there as an emergency essential in Iraq and had an hour off during some week, took some free time, went outside in his cutoffs, had a basketball, there was a hoop, put on his music, clearly not doing work-related activity, and mortar came in and he was wounded.

Would he be considered covered by worker's comp because of his war wound? And I thought that was a no-brainer and the Department of Labor guy said, "We will need to get back you on that" and we have not yet received an answer in two weeks that a civilian DOD employee who received a mortar wound, clearly doing something recreational, but that somehow they were applying civilian standards here in D.C., "Well, that was recreational. You are at the bar for happy hour or something," that wouldn't work.

I mean, does that surprise you that we actually still have this uncertainty from Department of Labor about that? Because it impacts—I think it is one of the questions that civilians will ask themselves, "Do I really want to be a civilian in that environment?"

Does that surprise you we have not gotten that?

General KIMMITT. Chairman, it does surprise me, and I think the answer is self-evident.

Going back to my uniform days, we had very clear regulations in terms of what injuries incurred in the line of duty and non-line of duty. Obviously, if that was a soldier playing basketball and—

Dr. SNYDER. Was mortared.

General KIMMITT [continuing]. Was mortared, there would be no question about that, or even back here in the states, if that happened while he was on a weekend and incurred a significant injury like that.

Now, there is a term called "thrill seeking" that they are not indemnified against. So if somebody is out there—

Dr. SNYDER. Bungee jumping while drunk without a rope.

General KIMMITT. Then they are not covered. That would be considered non-line of duty.

It does surprise me and I think all of us would advocate that those same rules apply to anybody that is in the combat zone serving our nation.

Dr. SNYDER. That was our concern, too.

One of the things that came out when, I think, we met with our representatives from Iraq, our PRT members, several of whom were still in the military, and one of them made a comment—maybe other members can correct me—but said, "You know, we actually wish that they weren't called the same thing," that the function of the PRTs in Iraq is so different from the PRTs in Afghanistan.

It is different functions. I think he said that, "We don't think we ought to have the term 'reconstruction.' We really are like an advisory group, a capacity-building for how the political process works."

And I suspect if we went around to most Members of Congress and said true or false, the PRT function in Afghanistan and Iraq is about the same, they would all say, "Oh, yes, it is about the same."

Is it that dramatic a difference—it sounds like it is—between the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq that we really need, as Members of Congress and policy-makers, to be looking on it as a different function?

Colonel Baker and General Kimmitt, maybe I will ask for your response, since it is primarily about Iraq now.

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, we have had this discussion before about the manning of the different PRTs in Afghanistan and

Iraq and I agree with what Mark Kimmitt read to you earlier in the handbook, that they do serve distinctly fundamentally different purposes in each of the two countries.

And clearly what the focus of the Iraq PRTs is is on—it does do some reconstruction, but its primary focus is on capacity-building. And I appreciate your comments that it can be misleading and perhaps may, in fact, cause those to be misinformed about what they do and their intent to support what they do.

But, yes, there is a difference between the two teams and capacity and reconstruction I think is the easiest way to visualize that.

Dr. SNYDER. The one aspect of that when I thought, well, maybe it was a good thing, is if you are an Iraqi and you are coming to be visited by somebody from the provincial reconstruction team, you may be more inclined to go to the meeting if you think this might mean I can get my bridge built, and you are not prepared for a lecture on, "Well, now you have got to go out there and raise the money and come up with a tax system."

I mean, maybe that is not what you are expecting, but maybe it gets more people to your meeting.

Let's see. Who is next here on our list?

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Jalalabad two weeks ago meeting with the PRT team there and got a great brief.

The conversation for about an hour and a half sounded a lot more like a chamber of commerce in Small Town, USA. The thing that I couldn't—I asked them a little bit about this, but it seemed to be missing, was the link between what the Afghans want and what we think they want.

The State Department guy walked us through a planning process that they had gone through with the team and all the good stuff, but there didn't seem to be any link with the local populous, local leadership in Jalalabad as to what they thought and how they wanted.

Can you talk to us a little bit of how you make sure that we are not doing or coming up with great ideas on behalf of people that may not link up with what they think are great ideas?

Mr. SHIVERS. It is absolutely essential that the PRTs be aligned with the local populous. A key role that they are playing is contributing to stabilization efforts in their area of responsibility through aligning themselves with the local populous as a key tool against counterinsurgents.

So if there is a disconnect, it needs to be corrected.

My own experience in Jalalabad, sir, I was there probably about four months ago, at the PRT, was that there was a great sensitivity on the part of the leadership with that subject and, indeed, I think we use Jalalabad PRT as a fine example of outreach at a wide variety of levels, not only from the center locale of the PRT, but the satellite, smaller PRTs that they have populated Nangarhar Province with.

So I am hoping that that is an impression, sir, rather than reality. I know there is great sensitivity, especially at that PRT, about that need.

I would also say, just going back to Congressman Akin's point, that PRTs, by their nature, are interim organizations. They are not meant to be permanent. And the biggest component of decisions about standing down a PRT in a place like Afghanistan will be based upon security environments.

So I am imagining that for decades, the need for reconstruction, development and everything will continue and that outreach to those local officials will be absolutely essential.

Mr. CONAWAY. I didn't mean to disparage those guys in Jalalabad, because I thought they were doing a terrific job.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Everything was on the list that they wanted to do were things that I would have lined up, as well.

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, there will always be tension between principals and advisors. So to the extent that our PRT members are attempting to convince local officials of paths ahead that will bear fruit for them in terms of establishing good practices and procedures, that will be useful, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. The interesting thing was that some of those guys that were at our chamber of commerce meeting had been in a four-hour gunfight the morning before.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. So there is an incredible disconnect to have them standing there talking about roads, canals and funding and all the kinds of things that every chamber of commerce in the United States does, to know that the morning before, they were wearing a much different hat. I was very proud of our group.

General WILKES. Sir, if I could make a comment on that. That is the key piece there, that you have got a pretty strong counterinsurgency and a lot of the projects that you want done and that the local community would want accomplished can't be defended.

So to expend that money on it at that point in time may not be the right decision.

Additionally, the way we tie that together from a national level down is we are looking at a ministry of interior representative at the PRTs, BCT level, so that we can integrate all of that activity up and down the chain here and make sure that the Afghans have a voice in what we are doing.

Mr. CONAWAY. One other quick one. We talked about incentivizing folks to take on these roles.

On the military side, who evaluates them? Who gives the performance reports and all those kinds of things on the folks that are serving? Those obviously follow on their entire career. How does that work on an individual basis?

General WILKES. When we go through the selection process, these PRTs are selected. The commander is screened. They have a two-month training program before they go over there.

The team is formed with about 85 or so folks. Largely, I would say 70-80 percent of it is National Guard-reserve component type folks with expertise in that particular area. They volunteer for this mission. They will go over for the full year.

And based upon their backgrounds, the expertise in whatever area, we fit that into the PRT. The normal report systems, OPRs,

EPRs, et cetera, are written at the end of their period and all of that is documented for their records.

Mr. CONAWAY. And who evaluates the commander?

General WILKES. The PRT commander is just like a battalion commander within a brigade combat team over there that works for CJTF-82, with the CJTF-82 two-star being the final authority.

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me make one other comment, if I could.

There was apparently an attempt to put together a National Guard group of farmers, by trade, to come over and specifically work in Nangarhar. They got waylaid somewhere, General Fallon or somebody, and the folks on the ground really wanted farmers to come work with—it is an agricultural issue there in Nangarhar, obviously.

So they were very disappointed that—

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I spoke personally with Admiral Fallon about that issue yesterday and he is looking into it.

Mr. CONAWAY. It is interesting. The State Department or USAID guy was not at the table. He was sitting on the back bench and the guys were talking about the need for agricultural expertise, not just the guys that knew how to grow stuff, but the process, the Ag industry to allow the local economy to grow and they needed all this help.

And then the USAID guy, when he got up, when it was his turn to talk, said, "We don't need anymore Ag guys over here. We have got all the Ag expertise we need." The 06 turned around and said, "I couldn't disagree with you more. What I need are farmers who actually run plows and tractors and understand exactly how that works."

Mr. SHIVERS. As you know, sir, agriculture employs about 80 percent of the Afghan population, directly or indirectly. So it is hard to imagine that we would have too much expertise in the country.

Mr. CONAWAY. I think the issue was they didn't want academic guys—what the colonel wanted was those who really make their own living doing that.

Mr. SHIVERS. As I understand the proposal, sir, it is an attempt to identify within the reserve ranks farmers and practitioners of agriculture, a variety of things, not only the farming itself, but all the vertically integrated industries associated with agriculture.

So my office considers it a very worthwhile effort and we are championing it.

General WILKES. Sir, I think what you are seeing is you have intervened a little bit into our staffing process and this is the normal discussion that goes on.

Our Joint Plans Officer (J-5) is out in Iraq and Afghanistan this week and that will be one of the topics that he is talking with CJTF-82 and all of the PRTs and Admiral Fallon is certainly re-engaging.

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, appreciate your leniency.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

I guess, for many of us, to see some success in Afghanistan and Iraq and particularly with the PRTs is certainly encouraging.

I wanted to go back to last week we had a State Department, and I know there were two colonels, a lieutenant colonel and a full bird colonel, and I think this is the point that Mr. Akin made or maybe Mr. Snyder.

The interesting that I observed about the lieutenant colonel—and, Mr. Chairman, you or Mr. Akin can correct me, and Mr. Conaway, but it seemed that the lieutenant colonel felt that if they had the authority and they were working as ones, that the program would be even more successful.

So I guess my point is, as this is evolving and, again, there are, I am sure, many, many frustrations which we have heard about and many successes, that it does have the potential to hopefully bring some peace to that area over the years.

The funding—I want to make sure I understand this. Mr. Shivers, the funding for the PRT program as it relates to the Department of Defense, what does that come out of and how much would that be?

Mr. SHIVERS. A key amount of it is CERP funds, commander's emergency reconstruction program.

Mr. JONES. What is that budget, do you know, approximately?

General WILKES. In fiscal year 2007, it was \$120 million.

Mr. JONES. And, Mr. Kimmitt, State's budget?

General KIMMITT. The gentlemen were referring to the numbers for Afghanistan. The numbers in Iraq are substantially higher due to the—we had \$800 million in 2006, roughly \$950 million in 2007, and we have gone forward to OMB with a consolidated request for Afghanistan and Iraq of \$1.2 billion for fiscal year 2008.

It has not yet been parsed how much to Afghanistan and how much to Iraq. The State Department budget, I think, is roughly \$50 million this year for the QRF for Iraq.

So it gives a sense of the difference between the budget for the Department of Defense and Department of State with regards to the money that we give the team leaders on the ground to obligate and to execute.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Shivers, I think you made in your comments—and I fully understood the 14th century commerce of Afghanistan and I think this is what Mrs. Davis and Mr. Davis both were trying to get to, and she articulated her question very well about the American people beginning to see the successes.

And I know that you mentioned, one of you gentlemen, that we have to have standards and metrics and that has to be developed. You can't have it today, but maybe it will become tomorrow.

At what point do you think, in the next year or two—Mr. Kimmitt, maybe you should be the one to answer this—that this Congress would be able to say to the American people, "This is the standard. This is the success."

General KIMMITT. Congressman, I believe you can tell the American people now that the PRT programs in both Afghanistan and Iraq are a success. They are a success for a number of reasons.

First of all, in the case of Iraq, we have taken a program which was nonexistent, there was no doctrinal basis for this prior to these operations. We talk about their new counterinsurgency strategy that we have developed, but, in fact, it was built on old counterinsurgency strategy.

What General McNeil developed in 2002 in Afghanistan, which migrated over to Iraq, is quite revolutionary in terms of doing this in war, developing this type of doctrine, developing these kind of policies in a very, very short time and to see the results that these PRTs are having on the day-to-day lives and the provincial councils inside of Iraq, in a very short period of time.

Let's put it in perspective. It has only been two, two and a half years since these have been done. And that these brave young men and women from the State Department, from our other agencies, from the Department of Defense have achieved the results that they have achieved to date, I think we can all stand in great appreciation and with legitimate comments about the success that has been made to this point.

I think you just have to go to a PRT to see what they are doing, whether it is in Panjshir, Nangarhar, Jalalabad, Babil, anywhere and you will see it.

And I think all of us recognize there is still much work to be done in terms of developing the long-term doctrine for the next conflict, for the next operation, but so much has already been done to this point that we ought to stand in gratitude for what has been accomplished up to this point.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Shivers, do you want to finish?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. I mentioned before that the PRT, by its nature, is an interim organization. It is also a joint organization, as we well know. It is military and civilian. And the key metric in Afghanistan is really the security environment that the PRT operates in, because that will allow it to stand down.

As security is increased and it becomes a permissive environment, then the activities that are conducted by the Department of State, the USAID and Department of Agriculture and any other civilian experts, engineers, will migrate over into more traditional forms.

So I believe that the security environment is the key metric for PRTs and proving them successful. That is why the military has such a prominent role, because they are so critical to the environment needed to transition to normal forms.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. We will go to a second round. We will begin with Mr. Akin and then to myself, and then Mr. Conaway and Mr. Jones, if anyone has additional questions.

Mr. Akin, for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Just a thought. First of all, as you talk about PRTs, it seems to me, if you have got a bunch of special operators sitting somewhere and they have got a mission, they take off of a shelf the different equipment that they need and they select the people they want to do a particular mission, it would seem to me that PRTs could be—you know, we could build on what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Obviously, you shape it depending on your mission and the nature of where you are working. If it is something where you need tremendous military security as opposed to you need a whole lot of farmers, you pick the tools that you need you put the team together and make it work.

It seemed to me that, at least on the surface, particularly when there is a military component, that maybe that could be a part of something the military does. You have people already identified, that if we get into this kind of thing, we are going to pull these people, just like the special forces guy pulls a parachute if he is going to jump out of a plane or whatever.

I guess the other question that we have been thinking about was taking what is going on in the local community, on the ground, and taking it much more to the macro level when you first go into a place like Afghanistan, into Iraq.

As we look back and kind of think what happened, a lot of us have a sense that the military was doing a good enough job maybe, but that there wasn't—that the State piece wasn't coordinated that well with the military.

All of a sudden, Bremer says, "If you are a member of the original leadership, they are all going to be disbanded." We didn't get the sense that—and the military had a plan that said, "Well, we are going to use middle management to stand up an army over there and the State Department has just said the army has just been dismissed."

So it didn't seem like the right hand knew what the left hand was doing at the sort of higher level.

Now, that may be a totally different situation and requiring jointness in terms of how we manage those operations from a PRT, but it seems like kind of similar to a PRT, just at a higher kind of level.

Do you want to comment on that? And do you see a parallelism or do you think a PRT is just sort of a totally separate entity and could be treated differently?

General KIMMITT. Well, sir, in the case of Iraq, I think you bring up a very good point, which is this notion of working as an interagency team can't simply be done at a PRT. It has to be part of the entire campaign.

And when one pulls back and talks to our coalition partners, they are in awe of the way that our interagency works, whether it is here in Washington, D.C., whether it is in the joint interagency coordination groups that we are developing in our component commands, or whether it is the great coordination that we see right now between Ambassador Haliza and between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus.

And that notion that this fight that we are in in Iraq is far more than simply a military operation, I mean, we have all watched Ken Burns over the last couple of days, and the war was seen to be—I am not sure I saw a civilian in that entire series.

It was all about military bringing force of arms to defeat two dictatorships, but that is not what we are seeing on the ground and many would say that the wave of the future is we must have a capacity to address not simply the military, but the nonmilitary aspects of what is going on.

We used to talk about the war on terrorism being about 90 percent nonmilitary, 10 percent military, and I think there is certainly a generation of young foreign service officers, lieutenants, young captains on the ground now that see this as a way of life.

They have not fought a war where they have not had a State Department person by their side, and that is going to continue to work itself up as they become older and take on more and more prominence.

So at least I think on this side of the table, and I would be surprised if it was not throughout the table, all of us understand that particularly in the types of operations that we see in Afghanistan and Iraq, but have also seen in Kosovo and Bosnia, that most of the tasks that need to be done on a day-to-day basis are what we call non-kinetic, nonmilitary, and all of us, I believe, are certainly in this direction.

As Ms. Davis talked about earlier, in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, resulting from some of the interagency problems and the inter-service problems that we had during Grenada, in this discussion, in many ways, you are preaching at the converted.

Mr. AKIN. So you are saying it is a continuous fabric from the top levels down just to the local guys and the PRT on the street, that it has to be a coordinated kind of effort.

General KIMMITT. Well, I suspect there is some old irredentists out there that believe that you don't need the State Department when you go into these types of operations or you don't need the military, but the ranks of those irredentists I think are getting smaller and smaller every day.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, Mr. Kimmitt, I hate to take part of my five minutes, but I don't know what the word "irredentist" means nor how to spell it.

General KIMMITT. What it means, Mr. Chairman, is somebody who doesn't sort of want to look to the future. They want to hold onto old concepts that don't square with the reality on the ground.

Dr. SNYDER. Traditions.

General KIMMITT. Many cases.

Dr. SNYDER. Traditions that no longer work.

I wanted to ask—by the way, I will put in a plug. I float this idea out there about once every six months, but it relates to some of the things you are saying, Mr. Kimmitt, in terms of how war has changed and contrasting with what has been going on, the focus on World War II through the Ken Burns' films.

But we may be better ahead as a country if we made foreign language training part of boot camp and assigned a foreign language to every person that comes in the military to say, "You are going to be the Farsi guy, you are going to be the Arabic guy," just do it by platoon.

So just from the very get-go, people would recognize that they are going to have more expected of them than just the ability to fire weapons or do air traffic control or something.

I wanted to ask, in terms of—because we are looking ahead in terms of a security transfer. The violence seems to be coming down somewhat in Iraq and sometime, six months, eight months, 12 months, you are going to have areas that you are going to want to transfer security over to Iraqi control.

What happens to the American-led PRTs in that situation? Are we still going to have military units going in with our Ag advisors and our foreign service officers?

Do you have a plan on how that is going to work? Colonel Baker or Mr. Kimmitt?

General KIMMITT. Yes, sir. General Odierno was back here the last few days and that point was brought up, as well. As part of the testimony from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, there were orders given down through the chain of command to reform their campaign plan.

This is one of those issues that they are grappling with. But there is a model already on the ground and that is what has happened in the south and what the British have done with their provinces is they have handed three of the four provinces over to provincial Iraqi control.

That is where we have the PSTs or what some would call the satellite PRTs. For example, in Muthanna, the PRT run by an Italian, Anna Prouse, out of Tallil, their satellite PSTs will go out to Muthanna and continue to work with them.

The security conditions are such that depending on the level of threat, that team will either have contractor support, perhaps Iraqi security force support, but as long as there is a need in that province for additional support with governance, then it is my estimate that the commanders will come back and say, "Even though we have handed over security control for the region, there is still need for more good governance procedures." So we are going to continue to support either through a satellite PST or various other ways.

Dr. SNYDER. So, Mr. Shivers, in Afghanistan, you said the basic component of a PRT there was 85 military, three American civilians, 85 American military and five Afghans, that you could envision 18 months from now having an area of Afghanistan where security is maintained by the Afghan national army, but there would still be a contingent of 85 U.S. military and three U.S. civilians and five Afghans going out as a unit in that area to provide security for that group.

Is that a fair statement or do you think that would be a work in progress that will evolve?

Mr. SHIVERS. Of course, we are looking forward to the day, sir, when we can stand down some PRTs. So depending upon the actual security conditions on the ground, we may be able to do that and we may be able to turn it over to ANSF forces and have a permissive environment where U.S. military presence isn't needed in that particular location.

Let me stress that I suspect that the civilian components of that PRT would then go over into more traditional avenues of assistance delivery.

So that we will continue probably to have officials in Afghanistan's provinces for many years to come, from the State Department, USDA, AID.

Dr. SNYDER. Then as Mr. Kimmitt said, may have contract security or some security would be just part of the function that you all would work out, depending on the area.

Colonel Baker has something he wanted to say.

Colonel BAKER. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that as part of the POTUS' direction to Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to revise the campaign plan, that issue, among others, are being looked at and they are looking at PRT team locations, they

are looking at size of PRT teams, will they need to grow larger in terms of their skill sets and components.

I think it is fair to say that the mission of the PRT team, although it is designed as a temporary organization, in a perfect world, they will do less and less every day because the capacity will improve in the provinces to govern themselves, that their mission will endure longer than the security mission, if trends continue to stay as they are and levels of violence go down.

But it will be a joint decision between embassy and MNFI in terms of the level and duration and sizes of the security component that has to accompany the PRTs. Until such time the environment is semi-permissive or permissive, you are going to still see MNFI maintain responsibilities to ensure that those teams can conduct those important missions they do.

But we have to wait to see how they—what the decisions are based on their analysis that they are going through right now.

We talk about this fairly often in our Iraq steering group that Mr. Kimmitt and I attend with our interagency colleagues and are very well aware of the USAID and State concerns and have been working with MNFI on this issue preceding the President's guidance to re-look at the campaign plan.

Dr. SNYDER. One of the frustrations expressed by several of the members of the PRTs we met with privately were that they got frustrated early on that security was not available. They did not have the ability to move around. They can't do anything without moving around their area geographically and they mean going out on roads and going to meet with people.

So as violence comes down, we know it will at some point, we want to be sure that they wouldn't go through that same frustration again of the security not being available if they still thought they had things to do.

Mr. AKIN. Just piggybacking on what you said, the one thing that one of the PRT teams said, they said you have died and gone to heaven is what it feels like when you have got dedicated people that are there to move you around.

When they had dedicated—

Dr. SNYDER. Uniformed military people.

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Uniformed people, that that was their sole mission was to help the PRT teams, they said that was when, "Boy, we really could get some stuff done when that was dedicated, that resource was dedicated."

Dr. SNYDER. I think they were saying as opposed to early on, some in the military thought they were kind of like an afterthought mission, but once they all got on the same page, like the CNO saying, "What you all are doing is really important" and word gets around, then they say things really started to click for them.

General KIMMITT. Chairman, if I could, that was one of the major elements of the embedded PRTs. We have a signed memorandum of agreement between our deputy secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of state that laid out in these new EPRTs those specific issues, which is the value of embedding them into military units and be seen.

I would suspect that the PRTs you are referring to are the older PRTs that were separate from the military units. What we have

learned is exactly as you have said—more work can be done, collocated, living, eating, working together, and that is one of the lessons that we are learning as we are developing the doctrine, the emerging doctrine for PRTs, which will probably be with us in many ways, perhaps in different forms, from these point forward in operations that we will be conducting.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway, we haven't forgotten about you. The technician accidentally pulled the plug here on the light. That is why it went out.

So Mr. Conaway, for five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes, last thing. Are there any legislative issues that need to be addressed that can make these things work better, barriers, laws or things that we can start chewing on that would, if implemented or gotten out of your way, make this initiative more successful?

Dr. SNYDER. Why don't we go right down the line? I would like to hear from each person. I had that question on my list, too.

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. I am not aware of any required legislative remedies.

General WILKES. No, sir, I am not either.

General KIMMITT. There has been a desire, and I believe there has been some proposed legislation on this notion of a civilian reserve corps.

One of the hard parts for DOD or the military to understand is that the State Department does not have courses in waiting. It is easy for us to—not easy, but the military has been designed so that there are forces standing by ready to deploy when the Nation calls.

If one takes a look at the State Department, it is a zero sum game. They don't have State Department officials sitting at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and training at Peason Ridge in Louisiana, just waiting for when the Nation calls.

But this notion that there be a civilian reserve capacity, whether in being or in reserve, to draw upon I know would be something that our policy people, such as our stability operations and some of the people over at the State Department, would be advocating for, to develop capacity so that it is not a zero sum game within the State Department to double the size of the Iraqi embassy in times of crisis or a future embassy in times of crisis has to be taken away from another organization, because those other organizations suffer as a result.

So to develop that type of capacity and, frankly, a State Department budget that reflects how important the State Department role is in the conduct of conflict in the future I think would be the two areas that we would ask the committee to consider.

Colonel BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I would echo what Mr. Kimmitt just said about the reserve civilian corps. The joint staff thinks that is a very important capacity that we think State Department needs.

We all realize that this is not an aberration. This is really an insight into what the future is going to look like in terms of how we pursue national security interests around the world.

I would just like to say that continued funding for the CERP programs and for the QRF, the new QRF program that the PRT teams

use now to support their activities is important and we would ask that you continue to support that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Quick response fund.

Colonel BAKER. Quick response fund, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. We sometime use the same acronyms.

Colonel BAKER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. The quick response fund is very similar to the CERP program. It is refreshingly known as State CERP.

Dr. SNYDER. Anything else, Mr. Conaway?

I wanted to ask, Mr. Kimmitt, you mentioned the adequate funding for the State Department, which I think has been a concern for some time. But some of us met privately with a foreign service officer within the last couple of days who took great offense at some of what he thought were misunderstandings and misdepictions in the press that somehow the State Department had fallen down.

And he felt that of the foreign service officer slots that were needed on the PRTs, that 100 percent had been filled appropriately, that, in fact, it was other agencies.

Now, we got into some disputes about that and discussions about, yes, but the State Department is supposed to take the lead in getting these other civilian slots.

You talk about adequate funding for the State Department, which I agree with you on. There probably needs to be some redundancy built into the system so that you could pull—we need to pull one or two veterinarians from Africa or China, wherever, but have some redundancy built in so the whole operation doesn't fall apart.

But that is going to have to be—veterinarians are probably not State Department employees. They are probably Department of Ag employees or USAID employees. You have got certainly Department of Justice issues—

We are going to need to look at redundancy and adequate funding all across the spectrum of government services, are we not?

General KIMMITT. I couldn't agree more, Mr. Chairman. Department of Treasury, for example, the work that they are doing with regards to setting up the system inside the treasury system and the distribution of funds inside of Iraq.

Department of Justice, the Rule of Law Task Force, the significant amount of work that is being done with the Rule of Law Task Force, whether the entire spectrum of legal issues that involve these types of operations.

Dr. SNYDER. All the agencies that are involved in these. As you said, we are gaining experience with these PRTs, what functions are there, that we may need to build some redundancy in the civilian side of government to deal with these international events and have that be part of somebody's job description.

You are going to be assigned to Washington, D.C., but you may be called to Bosnia or Afghanistan.

General KIMMITT. I am hard pressed to think of any agency in the Federal Government that couldn't add value to the types of operations we are seeing in Iraq and I suspect in Afghanistan, as well.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, a couple of you, in your written statements, and you mentioned just a minute ago, Mr. Kimmitt, mentioned the idea of civilian reserve.

I don't have a sense of how that would work beyond the two words put together in your statements. Are you talking about this being something totally new? Are you talking about this being as part of a National Guard function or U.S. Army Reserve function, like civil affairs?

When you say that, what are you saying exactly?

General KIMMITT. Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps it would be helpful at a separate time, when we could have the experts on this come and give you a briefing on the notion of the civilian reserve corps, because it would be—it is our view that it would be truly that, a civilian reserve corps, not one to be—some people may also be in the National Guard, some people also may be working for the Department of Defense.

But it is a very exciting policy proposal that is germinating from both State Department and from the Department of Defense.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is a fair statement. I have seen more of the concept I guess than anything that has really been hammered out.

We had experiences in Arkansas when the 39th was activated—well, different guard units have been activated where—I remember one of those lieutenant colonels in charge of one of the units was also a city mayor.

Well, his mayoral experience was probably as important as his military experience.

We had a police chief that was activated and that ability to organize a police department became important, too.

Laura, did any of the staff have any questions that you all think we didn't get to? Everybody okay?

Mr. Akin, do you have any further questions?

Mr. AKIN. No, I don't, but I very much appreciate your thoughts and it seems to me one of the most exciting positive developments of this last number of years.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, did you have any further questions?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I am sure that you covered all the ground. But maybe just really quickly, what do you see as the greatest obstacle to saying that we are in a very different place five years from now in terms of the way we look at this interagency work that is being done through PRTs and just generally?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think it is very easy to underestimate the difficulty of trying to create the conditions conducive to stability in a country like Afghanistan. It is really a place that was, as you well know, totally devastated by decades of destruction and mayhem.

And it requires an expeditionary nature on our part. It requires a tremendous amount of coordination with allies. In a place like Afghanistan, we have 72 nations and international official institutions operating.

And in Afghanistan, we pursue PRT initiatives through ISAF, through a NATO command. So we have our own PRTs, but importantly, we have those of the allied command structure.

So I think we have underestimated the complexity. It requires a total government effort and a total mobilization to be successful and even at that, it will take many more years than we would care.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are you optimistic that we have the wherewithal to do this?

Mr. SHIVERS. I am optimistic in the outcome, I really am. I think the issue for us is whether we are going to go through more pain than we need to and whether it will take a prolonged period of time to achieve that success.

But I am absolutely—I believe the Afghan cause is worthy and the people deserve our support. I think they are rooting for us, which is an important element. They would really like to see the international coalition succeed.

So I am optimistic, but I think it is a long, hard slog out there.

General WILKES. I would say that keeping our will and focus on this is going to be the key issue that we have got to face. It is definitely a worthy goal. I think the Afghanistan want us to succeed.

They are putting their backbone into it. We are developing people skills, lawyers from the get-go, justice systems from the get-go, commerce, roads and things like that. It is a very tough thing. It is a long process.

So to keep our will and focus is going to be hard.

General KIMMITT. Congresswoman, I think your question also asked the future of interagency coordination.

I remain enormously optimistic primarily because of the goodwill that I see not only at the highest level, but the goodwill that is amongst the individuals working together in some very, very difficult situations.

They understand what they are doing on the ground. These PRTs see the effects of what they produce and they also understand the risks that are involved, but yet they still continue to volunteer and they still continue to do brilliantly on the battlefield.

Along with the points that were made here, I think one of the major obstacles, to no one's surprise, will be that of resourcing over time and making sure that not simply the Department of Defense has a robust budget, but also the other agencies have the resources, whether it is in terms of the size of their organizations, the resources that they are given by the taxpayers of the United States, and, to some extent, the legislative capability so that they can go out and participate in these operations side by side and understand that they are able to do their job, whether they are Department of State, Treasury, Labor, Agriculture, with the same authorities, capabilities and resources that are given to the troops on the ground, as well.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it fair to look to the military to try and make the argument that those agencies should be funded, certainly not equally, but that they should be funded better?

Is there a way that you think that it is appropriate to do that?

General KIMMITT. My secretary has sat in front of committees and has made that argument and I think we will all continue to make that argument that the best probability of success in interagency operations will come about when all the agencies that are participating in the operations have the people, the funding and the authorities they need to cooperate and synchronize operations on the ground, along with the Department of Defense.

I certainly know that that is the administration position and I certainly know that that is the Department of Defense position.

Dr. SNYDER. General Wilkes, your comment about focus and will, I think that is an important statement. Focus and will are meas-

ured by resources and I am not sure that we are adequately resourcing the Afghan campaign the way we ought to and the responsibility of this committee.

I am pointing the finger not at you, but at us.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want you all to feel free, if anything comes to mind, that you want to amplify on any answer, feel free to submit any kind of answers or written statements. We will pass it out to committee members and append to the record.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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## **A P P E N D I X**

OCTOBER 4, 2007

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 4, 2007

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**Opening Statement of  
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**

**Hearing on "the Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial  
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq"**

**October 4, 2007**

The hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' second hearing on the role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a mix of military and civilian personnel, representing the three "D's" of stability operations: defense, diplomacy, and development. The PRT mission is to extend the reach of government in Iraq and Afghanistan, where they operate in a dynamic and non-permissive environment.

Several departments and agencies are involved in the PRT program besides the Department of Defense, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture. While we may choose to examine the role the other departments and agencies play in the PRT program at a later hearing, our witnesses today are DOD witnesses. By the PRTs' very nature, DOD plays a unique and critical role. Until PRTs work themselves out of a job, that is, until the security situation permits the replacement of the PRTs with more traditional diplomatic and developmental assistance efforts, DOD will be at the forefront of the PRT effort.

In most instances, military members make up the majority of the current PRTs' membership. Whether PRTs are able to get out and do their work is a decision ultimately made by the PRT's military commander or by the commander of the area's combat maneuver unit because PRTs operate in a non-permissive security situation. Moreover, PRTs spend funds appropriated to the Defense Department, including the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.

While every PRT is unique depending on the security situation on the ground and the maturity and developmental needs of the province in which they operate, there are three basic kinds of PRTs: the Afghanistan PRTs, and in Iraq, the "Primary PRTs" and the "embedded" PRTs. I would ask that our witnesses describe the different kinds of PRTs and the pros and cons of the various models being used.

I am also interested in learning how the PRTs are affected when security responsibility is transitioned to the host governments, when forward operating bases are closed or when maneuver troops are withdrawn from the area. The

subcommittee heard testimony that in Iraq, where provinces have transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control, PRTs have been unable to operate.

We chose the PRT topic both because PRTs are critical to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and because they represent a case study on how the interagency process works or doesn't work in Washington and in the field.

The PRT experience in Afghanistan and Iraq also should inform DOD's efforts to elevate stability operations to be equal in priority to combat operations.

Our panel of witnesses today includes:

- Mr. Mitchell Shivers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia Affairs;
- Major General Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Asia, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff;
- Mr. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and
- Colonel (Promotable) Ralph O. Baker, USA, Deputy Director Politico-Military Affairs, Middle East, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here.

**Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Armed Services Committee**

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**On the Department of Defense Role in Provincial Reconstruction Teams  
in Iraq and Afghanistan**

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**October 4, 2007**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good Morning to our witnesses, we appreciate you being here today.

Today's hearing is this subcommittee's second public hearing on the role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A PRT is an interagency team, comprised of civilian and military personnel employed in or with the mission of extending the reach of the government into regional provinces and local areas. As I understand it, Afghan PRTs focus on classic development projects, such as improving road networks, adding to the supply of electricity or water, and building schools and clinics. PRTs in Iraq, by contrast, place a stronger emphasis on capacity building rather than reconstruction. Capacity building is defined as

mentoring and training in good governance with the emphasis on building and growing local and provincial government. I'd like to learn more from our witnesses about how the PRTs are advancing the development and maturation of local governance.

A lot of people around here think that problems in Iraq need to be solved in Baghdad or in Washington, D.C. My view is that the solution rests in the local provinces, with local people putting the solutions together and solving their problems. If we take a look at how the United States was built, it is clear it wasn't built by starting in Washington, D.C. Our country was built by little towns and communities coming together—13 states and all. So, I'm not surprised that it appears our greater successes are happening at the local level in Iraq.

As I've stated previously, PRTs, and the subject of stabilization operations generally, is critical to transitioning a local area from a combat zone to a business development zone or a quiet residential neighborhood. In my view, sufficient troop strength combined with increasing the number of PRTs has had a significant, positive affect on building local communities.

Another aspect of the PRTs which I'm interested in is the interagency composition of the teams. We often hear that Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom require 'all elements of national power', though I think it's been the exception—not the rule—when this has happened. We've heard from former PRT members how PRTs operate on the ground and how interagency issues are resolved in theatre. I'm curious how the interagency in Washington works to support the PRTs. In particular, I'd like our witnesses to comment on the Department's role in shaping PRT policy and resolving PRT issues in the daily Afghanistan Operations Group meetings and in the weekly Iraq Steering Group meetings.

Finally, I'd like to understand how the Department's implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05—Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations—informs and is informed by DOD's work on PRTs. It seems to me that PRTs are the best, tangible example of a stabilization operation that the SSTR Directive contemplates. I'd like our witnesses to explain how the Department's policy arm is connecting the directive to the PRTs.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony.

**Statement of Mr. Mitchell Everett Shivers**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia**

**Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee**

**Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**

**“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan”**

**October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2007**

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Defense's role in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. PRTs have matured since November 2002 from a single, U.S.-led pilot project in Gardez, to a fully international effort involving 25 teams in the majority of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. PRTs now represent a major element of the mission to expand the reach of the Afghan government throughout the country. While the effectiveness of individual PRTs is sometimes uneven, the overall PRT effort is achieving noteworthy results and requires sustained support.

The role of PRTs was formally agreed to on January 27, 2005, by the PRT Executive Steering Committee – the international political-military body responsible for PRT direction and guidance – in the following mission statement:

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment ... and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts.”

Of the 25 existing PRTs, 12 are led by the United States. The military component of a U.S. PRT is commanded by a uniformed officer, and is task-organized to accomplish

the following functions: operations, administration, logistics, security, and a variety of enabling roles, including civil affairs and engineering. Each U.S.-led PRT has approximately 100 military personnel, though this number varies considerably. The PRT commander coordinates PRT activities with representatives from other parts of the U.S. interagency. In most instances, this includes representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture. Our commanders need civilian expertise for these PRTs to be successful and they appreciate their colleagues from other agencies who provide valuable advice and leadership. However, we must build additional civilian capacity to participate in these efforts. It is vitally important that we increase the personnel capabilities within civilian agencies and fund the creation of a “civilian reserve” to draw on outside experts when needed.

In addition to the resources and expertise leveraged by interagency PRT members, the PRT commander has at his or her disposal Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which are used to address urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. CERP remains one our commanders’ most effective tools in helping ordinary Afghans see positive changes in their daily lives.

PRTs in Afghanistan all fall under the broad authority of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), although several other organizations have been established to help ensure unity of effort among various stakeholders. The most important example, the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), provides high-level policy direction and includes the Afghan Minister of the Interior, the ISAF Commander,

the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative, the EU Special Representative, and ambassadors of PRT troop contributing nations.

NATO reports that, as of July 2007, PRTs have completed over 9,000 projects in all development sectors. While this achievement is notable, it is more useful to focus on less quantifiable aspects of what PRTs do. Firstly, PRTs act as "small embassies" for the various reconstruction efforts being undertaken by the Afghan government, military forces, aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan. They also provide a mechanism for mentoring officials of Afghanistan's ministries at the provincial level. Further, PRTs serve as a vehicle for aligning the priorities set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the overarching strategic document for long-term development in Afghanistan. Importantly, PRTs reinforce the international community's commitment to the people of Afghanistan.

Although the overall PRT construct is an effective and necessary component of the mission in Afghanistan, the PRT effort faces several challenges. By nature, PRTs are civil-military entities, and therefore demand close coordination between the various interagency contributors. As such, PRTs are highly dependent on the leadership skills and teamwork abilities of the PRT commander and his or her interagency colleagues. Additionally, because PRTs fall under NATO direction, extensive coordination and consensus between Allies is required to foster unity of effort. Lastly, different countries inherently have different capabilities and resources at their disposal, and some must rely on other, more capable Allies for assistance in establishing and operating PRTs.

In considering the role of PRTs in Afghanistan, it is necessary to place them in the appropriate context. The international community, in partnership with the Afghan government, is undertaking one of the most ambitious stabilization and reconstruction efforts in history. PRTs play a crucial role in that effort. We jointly are extending the reach of a government in a nation that has endured decades of war, and a nearly complete destruction of its infrastructure, economy, and political institutions. We are making progress, but ultimate success will take many years, and will demand the sustained interest and commitment of the United States and the international community.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL BOBBY WILKES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS  
(ASIA)

BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ON

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) PROGRAMS

OCTOBER 4, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

**Statement of Major General Bobby J. Wilkes, United States Air Force**

**Joint Staff, J5, Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs-Asia**

**Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee**

**Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**

**“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan”**

**October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2007**

Thank you for the invitation to testify on the military role in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. In order to accelerate development of Afghanistan, the US Military in 2002 created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to integrate US military, US interagency, and host-nation government officials. Initially the US Government listed three goals for the PRTs: establish security, extend the writ of Afghan government into the provinces, and assist reconstruction. The number of teams expanded from three in 2003, to twenty-five today. The United States military leads twelve and coalition nations lead thirteen. PRTs are increasingly more important and contribute significantly to Afghanistan's progress. For the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), the PRT is now the principal vehicle to leverage the international community and Afghan government reconstruction and development programs.

The recent US Strategic Review of Afghanistan recognized the need to increase the resiliency of the Afghan Government against the insurgency, strengthen the US Government counter-insurgency efforts, and speed-up development. Many counter-

insurgency experts agree that effective interagency cooperation establishes the conditions for successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency. The PRT serves as the principle vehicle for coordinating the US and Afghan efforts securing common goals in Afghanistan.

The American led PRTs fall under the command of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, as overall National Command Element lead for US forces operating in Afghanistan. CJTF – 82 coordinates PRT operations with ISAF headquarters and the US Embassy for policy guidance. All efforts are in support of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The PRT projects are funded largely with Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds and with US Agency for International Development (USAID) funds, and execution is synchronized at subordinate CJTF-82 command levels.

A US-led PRT consists of approximately eighty-five American military members, three American civilians, and five Afghans. The commanding officer of a PRT and his interagency team are responsible for advising local Afghan government officials, coordinating international community reconstruction efforts, and facilitating local government's efforts. Two Civil Affairs teams and an engineer advisory team coordinate development and capacity-building activities directly with local officials, tribal elders, private contractors, UNAMA, and NGOs. A Military Police team coordinates the training and actions of the Afghan National Police. The military component also includes a PSYOPS unit, bomb disposal team, an intelligence team, medics, an administration and

support section, and a force protection platoon to facilitate freedom of movement throughout their area of responsibility.

Normally located with the PRTs are three US civilian personnel from State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture, and one Afghan Government Official from the Ministry of Interior. The State Department's Foreign Service Officer (FSO) serves as a political advisor to the PRT commander and the Afghan Provincial Governor. The USAID Field Program Officer (FPO) advises on development work; the Department of Agriculture employee advises the PRT on agriculture development issues; and the Afghan Ministry of Interior official provides advice on local political dynamics and facilitates intelligence collection.

PRTs train as a team for eight weeks at Fort Bragg, North Carolina before they deploy. The training includes the participation of US Government civilians from the State Department, USAID and USDA. The most recent training in the winter of 2006 included participation by Afghans. This invaluable team training includes weapons handling, convoy operations, cultural awareness, and theatre immersion.

In addition to supporting the Afghan National Development Strategy, PRTs are a key enabler of the counterinsurgency strategy--separating the enemy from the populace, connecting the government with the people, and transforming the environment at the sub-national level. The US PRT in the Panjshir Valley is an excellent example of success. Strong cooperation between ground forces, the local government, and the local populace enabled the completion of approximately ninety projects. Coordinating additional road construction and a wind farm coupled with other USAID projects resulted in a district

center with electricity and many market opportunities. The activities of the PRT are setting the conditions that bring more local support to the central government, further separating the local population from the insurgency, and continuing to transform the lives of the Afghan people. The PRT is the entity to facilitate progress and ensure both the counter-insurgency and national development efforts are complementary and ultimately successful.

Our goal for the future is for the reach of the Afghan central government to expand into the Provinces and districts. With improved security conditions and an increasing local government capacity, the PRT role and functions will reflect the changing environment and accommodate increasing Afghan government capability. As we look to the future, perhaps the biggest challenge in fielding PRTs will be finding well-qualified experienced people to serve as team members. Although PRTs are not exclusively a military project or program, the initial reliance on DoD personnel to staff PRTs is not surprising: DoD is the only department of government that currently has the capacity to surge. The State Department and other agencies can hire additional personnel over time, and are doing so. However, the lesson of Iraq, and of Afghanistan as well, is that our nation would be well served if there existed a “surge” capacity in the non-military skill sets that are so important in the kind of conflicts we have been engaged in since the early 1990’s. We must build additional civilian capacity to participate in these efforts. It is vitally important that we increase the capabilities within civilian agencies and fund the creation of a “civilian reserve” to draw on outside experts when needed.

A reserve corps of civilian experts – civil engineers, retired local government officials, business executives, water and sewer managers, comptrollers, public health administrators and the like – could provide a rapid-response capability the nation lacks today.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

**DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MIDDLE EAST)  
MARK T. KIMMITT  
TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
OCTOBER 4, 2007**

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

As you know, the mission of the PRTs is to assist Iraq's provincial and local governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

PRTs are a vital component of U.S. strategy in Iraq, and advance our counterinsurgency strategy by bolstering moderates, promoting reconciliation, fostering economic development and building local, municipal, and provincial capacity in ways that will benefit the lives of Iraqi citizens.

PRTs do this, in large part, by establishing and strengthening relationships with local leaders—business, community, and elected officials. They are

improving governance capacity by passing on the technical, managerial, and fiscal skills that enable local government officials to provide essential services and other key development projects to the Iraqi people. The result is a growing self-reliance at the local and provincial government levels. You have heard the term, “bottom-up” progress – PRTs are at the forefront of this progress.

State Department has the lead for PRTs in Iraq, but they are truly an inter-agency effort. They are helping Iraqis improve their ability to govern and develop their economy because of the experience and skills of those who serve on PRTs. State Department Foreign Service Officers, Defense Department civil affairs and engineer officers, USAID project leaders, Department of Justice rule of law experts and Department of Agriculture development specialists are working together alongside military units to achieve noticeable and rapid results in Iraqi communities.

Currently, there are 10 “pre-surge” PRTs, 15 embedded PRTs (ePRTs) and five Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) on the ground in Iraq. The 10 original PRTs were established in 2005 and 2006 and focus primarily on the provincial government level. Seven of these are led by the United States while three are led by our Coalition Partners from Great Britain, Italy and Korea. As part of the

President's January 2007 "New Way Forward" strategy, the President directed the number of PRTs be increased. These 15 additional embedded or "ePRTs" work closely with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and focus on district and local level governance. The five Provincial Support Teams, comprised of one or two members, serve in areas where there is not a major presence of U.S. forces.

Although the Department of State has the lead in reconstruction efforts, DoD, due to its surge capabilities, provided personnel on an interim basis to expedite standing up the "New Way Forward" ePRTs. This demonstrates the need for a civilian reserve capacity. Civilian expertise is needed for PRTs to be successful. It is important that we increase the capabilities within civilian agencies and create a "civilian reserve" to draw on outside experts when needed.

ePRTs have only been in place for a few months, but early reports are encouraging and we are seeing positive results. Over time, we hope to see increased capabilities from the Iraqis to govern themselves at the provincial and local levels from the hard work of the U.S. men and women serving on these ePRTs and other PRTs.

I look forward to answering your questions.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL  
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

COLONEL RALPH BAKER  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS  
(MIDDLE EAST)

BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ON

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) PROGRAMS

OCTOBER 4, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman (Dr. Vick Snyder, USMC 67-68) and Congressman Akin, members of the committee, thank you for your interest in our nation's security and the honor of testifying before you this morning. I appreciate your support of the men and women of our Armed Forces who around the world, often in very difficult and challenging environments, and far from home and family are making a difference.

Our goal remains an Iraqi government that transitions to self-reliance where all Iraqis unite against violence and perceive the Government of Iraq as the legitimate authority that provides security, law and order, and basic services. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are frontline civilian-military operators who serve a vital role in the campaign to stabilize Iraq with our coalition partners. They serve as the primary interface between US and coalition partners and provincial and local governments throughout Iraq.

As part of the President's January 07 "New Way Forward" strategy, The interagency, led by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (State), partnered in order to double the 10 "paired" PRTs--so named because of their specific alignment with

geographic provinces and whose principle focus is the provincial government. The 10 additional PRTs integral to the President's New Way Forward are embedded, or ePRTs, whose principle focus is on district and local governments. These ePRTs work hand-in-glove in Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) or their marine counterpart, Regimental Combat Team.

Although the Department of State has the lead in reconstruction efforts, at the request of Secretary Rice, DoD agreed to provide some personnel, on an interim basis, to expedite standing up the 10 "New Way Forward" ePRTs. Over the summer the teams were formed from personnel provided by DoD, State, USAID, Department of Justice, and Department of Agriculture.

These teams have already begun to make a positive impact. For example, PRTs have been instrumental in developing local capacity to prioritize funds and manage projects. As a result of PRT technical assistance, provinces have obligated over \$1 billion dollars worth of Iraqi funded reconstruction projects: a significant achievement in a country with a history of central control. Iraq now has provincial

councils sitting together debating the merits of various projects, developing a budget, and letting contracts. This effort not only helps build local capacity for budget execution, but improves the democratic process as disparate interests compete for resources and parties negotiate and bargain to resolve complex problems.

Concurrent with the standup of the 10 ePRTs over the spring and summer, manning was authorized for the formation of an additional four new ePRTs with the specific goal of providing a balance of security, economic, and governance initiatives in under-served areas of Baghdad and Southern Diyala. A fifth new ePRT is also being assembled from manpower within theater. These 5 new ePRTs are currently forming and will begin to function by the end of October bringing the total number of PRT/ePRTs to 25 (10 “paired” PRTs and 15 ePRTs). Throughout these processes, DoD has coordinated closely with the State Department and beginning in November, State will begin a phased replacement of the interim DoD personnel on the 10 “New Way Forward” ePRTs.

We attribute a large part of the success of PRTs to their versatility and skill sets tailored to the specific challenges of their local

environments. Additionally, embedded PRTs provide a unique benefit as a result of their integration with their host Combat Teams. What we have learned is that the fusion of the PRT with their Combat Teams helps coordinate objectives. As stated by Ambassador Crocker in his congressional testimony earlier this month, this embedded concept has become a force multiplier that he is considering implementing with the other paired PRTs.

The strategic situation in Iraq will ultimately be solved by political means. To that end, PRTs play an integral role in advancing the political process from the local, district and provincial level. Thank you for allowing me to testify before you this morning. I look forward to answering your questions.



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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
RECORD**

OCTOBER 4, 2007

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Now, a couple of you, in your written statements, and you mentioned just a minute ago, Mr. Kimmitt, mentioned the idea of civilian reserve.

I don't have a sense of how that would work beyond the two words put together in your statements. Are you talking about this being something totally new? Are you talking about this being as part of a National Guard function or U.S. Army Reserve function, like civil affairs?

When you say that, what are you saying exactly?

General KIMMITT. Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, and Ms. Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities briefed the committee on October 18, 2007.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) support most of the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the overarching strategic guidance document for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. PRTs operationalize the ANDS, assisting the Afghan government extend its authority to the regions. This helps facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT acts as a focal point for coordinating much of the reconstruction efforts in the provinces, provide training and mentoring to Afghan officials, and help execute projects so that Afghan people are able to see positive developments in their lives, thereby increasing their confidence and trust in the government. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under whose direction all PRTs fall, has published data (attached) that offers an overview of the scope and type of reconstruction and development work that PRTs have accomplished. While the ISAF data remains an evolving product, it has captured a significant portion of the impact PRTs have made in the country.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of their work plans?

Mr. SHIVERS. Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) 82, Major General Rodriguez, commands the 12 U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Individual PRTs are under the command of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander, who in turn reports to CJTF-82. The BCT commander approves PRT plans and is responsible for the execution of counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts in his area of responsibility. CJTF-82 operates under the direction of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). CJTF-82, ISAF, and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul work closely on PRT planning in order to ensure synchronization of efforts. Finally, the Afghan government and the international community meet regularly in two forums in Kabul—the PRT Executive Steering Committee and the PRT Working Group—to further coordinate PRT efforts and apply lessons learned.

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time. What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies, guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. PRTs do not require new force structure but they do require additional

training and education of the PRT units and members to inform them of the environment in which they are to operate.

DoD is granted statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. 1508(a), to designate positions that meet the following three criteria as "Emergency Essential". The following criteria apply to all DoD appropriated and non-appropriated fund positions, whether they are general schedule (GS) or working grade (WG).

1. The duties of the position provide immediate and continuing support for combat operations or are to support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of the armed forces;

2. The employee must perform those duties in a combat zone after the evacuation of non-essential personnel (including any dependents of members of the armed forces) from the combat zone in connection with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, or the commencement of combat operations of the armed forces in the zone; and

3. It is impracticable to convert the employee's position to a position authorized to be filled by a member of the armed forces because of a necessity for that duty to be performed without interruption.

DoD Directive 1404.10 ("Emergency Essential (E-E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees") requires positions that meet the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1580 to be designated as emergency essential, and requires documentation of the designation within the position descriptions for the positions. The directive further requires emergency essential positions to be coded in automated civilian personnel records and reported quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The authority provided under 10 U.S.C. 1580 and the DoD implementing policy under DoD 1404.10 accounts for deployment of civilian employees to combat zones. However, the Department deploys DoD civilians to support combat, contingency and emergency operations throughout the world, whether or not their positions are designated as emergency essential. Such employees generally are employee volunteers and typically serve in a temporary duty (TDY) status.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Afghanistan informing DOD's work in developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction," which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq are a key civil-military adaptation the Department is examining in its implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and its support to the State Department-led effort to implement National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization", across the U.S. Government.

Both DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 focus on improving civil-military integration. PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many U.S. agencies and working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity. DoD aims to take the lessons learned from PRTs in order to build even more effective civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. DoD has found that the available pool of capable, experienced civilians from which to draw has been very limited. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with a support role in mind while recognizing that the military may be required to perform certain missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Manning and Personnel Directorate (J1), and the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) are the main offices that coordinate policy, training and manning issues for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) within DoD.

PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan embody very different operational constructs and missions, therefore an overall lead within the policy offices (OSD Policy and J5) depend on the region. The principal coordinator for PRTs in Afghanistan is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PDASD) for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (APSA). PCC meetings on PRTs in Afghanistan are attended by the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Central Asian Affairs, who reports to the PDASD (APSA).

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities leads the development of future PRT-like concepts of civil-military teaming.

This arrangement allows different offices to apply their given expertise (country-specific, future concepts, training and manning) for PRTs.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

Mr. SHIVERS. Most U.S. Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan are staffed with two (2) Civil Affairs teams, consisting of approximately eight (8) personnel. The missions and operations of these Civil Affairs teams should not be viewed as distinct from the broader missions and operations of the PRT. Instead, Civil Affairs teams are enablers for PRTs: they focus on military planning, execution, and resource allocation in support of civil actions tailored to the counter-insurgency environment, as delineated by the PRT's integrated command group (PRT Commander, and the State, USAID, and USDA representatives).

Dr. SNYDER. We have been hearing a lot about how PRTs are attempting to improve the security situation on the ground, and that in Afghanistan, security is the key metric of success for PRTs, but what about the reconstruction aspect of PRTs? It seems some PRTs are not engaged in much—if any—reconstruction, but are rather being used as an extension of U.S. military operations separate from the ISAF effort. How much of the PRT's work is focused on actual reconstruction?

Mr. SHIVERS. Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) play an important role in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The attached data, made available by NATO ISAF, demonstrates the scope of reconstruction and development activities undertaken by PRTs.

A critical component of the Department of Defense efforts in Afghanistan reconstruction is made possible through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). Targeted at quick response humanitarian needs, CERP funds enable local commanders to execute projects that can directly impact the lives of local Afghans.

In FY 2006 and FY 2007, DoD obligated approximately \$200 million per year in CERP funds within Afghanistan. PRTs have become recognized sources for coordinating high payback CERP projects. The theater standard operating procedures recognizes the benefits of a joint U.S. effort. Working with the PRTs, local commanders have been able to focus CERP projects to complement PRT projects in addressing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

General WILKES. The PRTs in Afghanistan are focused on facilitating the Afghan Government's ability to realize the goals and objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and defeating the insurgency. The ANDS is the Afghan master plan for security, governance, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It was developed by the Afghan government in close coordination with the international community to drive governance reform, development, and bring security to the people of Afghanistan. Officials in the PRTs help the provinces support this national plan through coordination, mentoring provincial officials, facilitating the processes to support the strategy (working with Provincial Councils to develop Provincial Development Plans), and allocating funding/projects to support ANDS-supported programs. All PRTs fall under ISAF and are managed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) for policy and coordinated actions. The PRTs are vehicle for sub-national deployment of counter-insurgency initiatives and actions for ISAF. Their primary counter-insurgency role is to connect the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to the people and transform the environment. US PRTs support US policy guidance by operating under the command and control of CJTF-82, the US ISAF command, and in close coordination with Embassy Kabul through the Dept. of State and USAID reps.

#### Measurable Gains

In 2001, 8 percent of Afghans had access to some form of healthcare; now with over 670 hospitals and clinics built and outfitted, more than 80 percent of the population has access to medical care. Almost 11,000 doctors, midwives, and nurses have been trained. In 2001, when we went into Afghanistan and liberated it from the Taliban and al Qaeda, only some 900,000 children were enrolled in school. Today there are more than 5 million students in that country. More than 1.5 million of them are girls. We know the exact number of girls were in school in 2001 because

that number was Zero. PRTs built and/or coordinated the construction for many of these clinics, schools, and supporting facilities.

Since 2001, there's been a 24 percent decline in mortality rates for infants and children under 5, saving 85,000 young lives every year; More than 70 percent of the population—including 7 million children—have been inoculated against polio as opposed to just 35 percent 2 years ago. PRTs coordinate this type of activity at the Provincial level.

And the progress we have made cuts across all fields. In 2001, there was no formal banking system. Today there is a functioning Central Bank with more than 30 regional branches and a single, internationally traded currency. Afghan economic growth hovers between 12 and 14 percent per year, outstripping even India. The PRTs helped fuel the growth in the Afghan services industry. Before, the dominate source of income was agriculture. The service industry now accounts for 42% of the licit GDP. Income per capita has nearly doubled to \$355, compared to \$180 three years ago.

And modernity, absent for decades, is returning to Afghanistan. There are now three mobile telephone companies serving over 3.5 million subscribers—almost 11 percent of the population. The PRTs facilitated the infrastructure development to support this Telecom boom.

In 2001, there were 50 kilometers of paved roadway; now, more than 7,400 kilometers of roads have been built and paved, with 1600 more kilometers due to be completed this year. A new bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan opened recently, creating new opportunities for regional trade and commerce. PRTs coordinated the execution of the US-led national roads program at the provincial level, and continue to develop the provincial and district roads that flow from the national road program development.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of their work plans?

General WILKES. In Afghanistan the 12 US PRTs are under the command of CJTF-82, commanded by Major General Rodriguez. Each of the PRTs falls under the direct command, control and supervision of a BCT commander (O-6 level command). The BCT has a civil-military planning cell on the staff that communicates with the CJTF-82 civil-military staff section, the CJ9. The CJ9 works in close coordination with the ISAF CJ9 and the US Embassy Country team to leverage the interagency expertise and synchronize the US Government and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan. This ensures the governance and development lines of operation are coordinated, properly resourced, and support US policy. The security line of operation for the PRT is also synchronized, coordinated and resourced first at the BCT-level. The BCT supports the plans and directives of CJTF-82, and CJTF-82 operates under the direction of COM ISAF.

Execution and implementation are measured and overseen by the same command and control structure responsible for planning. The PRT's work plans are approved and monitored by the BCT Commanders. The BCT commanders are responsible for the success and failures of the counter-insurgency efforts in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The PRT is one of the BCT CDR's subordinate units, and the primary tool for synchronizing and enabling the development and governance lines of operation in the BCT's area of operations (AOR).

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time. What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies, guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

General WILKES. The DOD military sourcing policy for filling the PRT manpower requirements is based on the Joint Request For Forces (RFF) process. The manpower requirements and skill sets for the PRTs were previously validated by the Commander of Central Command and passed to the Joint Staff for action. The Joint Staff passes the requirements to Joint Forces Command to fill the personnel billets through a sourcing process where requirements are filled based upon Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) by each of the services. In the PRT the major functions are command, logistics, administration, security, and enablers. The command slots are filled by leaders hand-picked by the services for their leadership skills and past performance. The administrative, logistics, and security functions are filled by available units and personnel from the services who are specifically trained to perform these functional duties. The enabler requirements are filled by the services with

specific, low-density skills such as engineers, civil affairs, military police/police trainers, and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs). The requirement for the PRTs in Afghanistan is a “standing RFF” with specific skill set requirements that match military occupation specialties. The requirement for these specific skill sets drive the military force development process to ensure the services can meet the current and future needs of the CENTCOM Commander.

Currently no DOD civilians are deployed with the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Afghanistan informing DOD’s work in developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction,” which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

General WILKES. The PRT experience informs DOD’s work on developing stability operations capabilities through studies and products from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). CALL produced the PRT Playbook, the most recent comprehensive product that captures the lessons learned from PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Periodically the CALL conducts on-site visits to capture lessons learned for their quarterly reports. This information is routinely shared with the Joint Center for Operational Lessons Learned and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC).

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

General WILKES. The principal DOD coordinator for PRTs in Afghanistan is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia Pacific and Security Affairs (APSA). There is no overall PRT coordinator within DOD; however, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC) has the overall lead on policy matters related to the future of PRTs and PRT-like concepts. PCC meetings on PRTs in Afghanistan are attended by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Central Asian Affairs, who reports to the PDASD (APSA).

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

General WILKES. PRTs in Afghanistan are currently manned with the appropriate number of civil affairs teams (2 per PRT). More civil affairs teams on a PRT would require a larger security contingent. The current Afghan PRT security force structure supports the mission requirements for two civil affairs teams and the command group (PRT commander, USAID rep, USDA rep, and DOS rep).

Civil affairs is one of the enabling components of the PRT mission. The other enabling components are military police/police trainers, engineers, and PSYOPs. The civil affairs teams in the Afghan PRTs execute and implement the actions that are planned and coordinated by the PRT command group, the Brigade Combat Team Commander, and support CJTF-82’s Operational Plan and the directives of the commander. Civil affairs missions focus military planning, coordination and expenditure of resources to facilitate civil actions to support the military mission; in the case of Afghanistan it is to support a counter-insurgency.

Dr. SNYDER. We have been hearing a lot about how PRTs are attempting to improve the security situation on the ground, and that in Afghanistan, security is the key metric of success for PRTs, but what about the reconstruction aspect of PRTs? It seems some PRTs are not engaged in much—if any—reconstruction, but are rather being used as an extension of U.S. military operations separate from the ISAF effort. How much of the PRTs work is focused on actual reconstruction?

General WILKES. A lack of adequate security is a symptom of the problem that drives an insurgency; it is not the root cause. The PRT improves the security of a particular area by enabling the government to connect with the people and eventually transform the environment. The PRTs help the Afghan government connect with the populace by building capacity in the Provincial and District governments to meet the needs of their constituents, providing limited security and mobility as necessary to government officials to gain access to the people and meet with local leaders (tribal elders), and in many cases improving the government-provided services such as roads, bridges, humanitarian aid distribution, and education. The PRTs also assist the sub-national Afghan government in the transformation of the environment by facilitating the planning, coordination, and resourcing of reconstruction and development in Provinces and Districts. By executing these tasks the PRTs improve the security of the situation on the ground.

US military forces in Afghanistan obligated more than \$80 million in FY 2006 in Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding for Afghan capacity building and reconstruction and development. In FY 2007 the US military obligated \$120 million for the same purposes. PRTs dispersed more than 80% of this funding.

PRTs operate under the command and control of ISAF, and all actions are managed through CJTF-82 (an ISAF command). PRTs are fully engaged in the coordination and execution of reconstruction. Their contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan dwarfs that of all other entities from the international community except for USAID. Depending on the particular Province roughly 75% of PRT work is in reconstruction and development, 15% in capacity building and governance, and 10% in security.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Iraq support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

Colonel BAKER. The work of PRTs in Iraq supports the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP), written in concert by MNF-I and the US Embassy, and the New Way Forward Strategy. The essence of the PRT mission is to coach, train and mentor provincial, district and municipal governments to increase their capacity to govern and deliver essential services and to assist in developing local economies. This effort supports the JCP and its strategic objectives.

One key area where PRTs have focused their efforts to fulfilling the broader strategy in Iraq is budget development and execution. Effective budget development and execution helps increase the ability of local governments to provide services for their citizens, increases coordination and interaction between central and local governments, and builds management, planning, and leadership skills for government officials.

Through the Local Governance Program, PRTs have trained 2,000 council members, 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general and key staff in 380 departments to manage and execute budgets. In turn, Provincial Councils are improving their ability to plan and execute budgets. For example, by the end of 2006, provinces had committed only 49% of their budget funds. To date, according to PRT data, provinces have already committed 60% of their 2007 budget funds.

Provincial Councils are also increasing their ability to conduct long term planning and development and incorporate this into their budgets. For example, on October 10, 2007 the Baghdad Provincial Council's strategic planning committee completed its Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) and presented it to the Ministry of Planning. By coordinating how provincial and national governments create and spend their budgets over the coming years, the PDS is described by provincial officials as the most important mechanism connecting these governance entities. This was the result of a one-year-plus effort by provincial officials, working closely with PRT and USAID staff, who provided capacity development and technical assistance.

As provincial councils become more effective at budget execution, the central government has increased the amount of money in their budgets. For example, on September 30 the Provincial Council of Babil was rewarded for its effective budget execution with an additional \$40 million in its 2007 capital expenditures budget. The Provincial Council of Anbar was rewarded with a 70 percent increase in its 2007 provincial capital budget. The amount of the GOI capital budget that goes directly to the 18 provinces is expected to increase next year, and PRTs will continue to coordinate with Provincial Councils in the planning and execution of their budgets.

PRTs have also worked with and coordinated ethnic and political reconciliation initiatives in Nineva, Anbar, Diyala, Wasit, and Karbala. PRTs brought tribal leaders and government officials to work in concert on stemming the influence of militias and terrorist organizations and improving border security. As we have seen in Anbar, and are starting to see elsewhere, these initiatives are making demonstrable contributions to local political reconciliation and the restoration of a secure environment, which helps facilitate improved economic development and governance.

Dr. SNYDER. Who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of their work plans?

Colonel BAKER. OSD-Policy, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and its subordinate units down to the BCT/RCT level, are involved in the PRT planning process. BCT Commanders co-author civil-military plans with their ePRTs that are approved by MNC-I. In its campaign planning and execution, MNF-I works with the Embassy Team and the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) on PRT planning. OSD-P and Joint Staff J1 and J5 action officers attend regular working group and sub-working group meetings in Washington D.C. on PRTs.

OSD-Policy, Joint Staff/J1 and J5 and Navy worked together with the State Department to plan and oversee the surge ePRT manning process when the President announced the New Way Forward Strategy in January 2007. This effort culminated

in a memorandum of agreement between the departments on ePRT manning and backfill.

On behalf of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad approves PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans. Through a steering group, OPA consults closely with the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, USAID, the rule of law working group, the Political, Political/Military and Economic sections, and with MNF-I and MNC-I on work plans, their progress, and planning for the future of PRTs.

OPA holds PRTs and their members accountable through regular performance reviews of personnel, by reviewing work plans in progress, and through activity reports submitted by the PRTs. OPA initiated an interagency working group to establish performance indicators for PRTs and for assessing progress of provincial governments. Baseline assessment of the provinces will be completed by the end of November 2007 and work plans will be adjusted accordingly.

Dr. SNYDER. Witnesses stated they believed PRTs would be with us for some time. What is the DOD military personnel policy, and derived Service personnel policies, guiding the force structure planning, training, and education skill sets for PRTs and PRT-like missions (SSTR operations)? What is the DOD civilian personnel policy on coding civilian positions as deployable for both GS and WG employees? Do these policies account for deployment to war zones rather than secure locations?

Colonel BAKER. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. The mission is specifically tailored for Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers along with Reserve and National Guard Soldiers who bring their civilian skills and knowledge to the reconstruction effort. PRTs do not require new force structure but do require additional training and education of the CA units and attached members to inform them of the environment in which they operate.

DoD is granted statutory authority under section 1580 of title 5, United States Code, to designate positions that meet the following three criteria as "Emergency Essential". The following criteria apply to all DoD appropriated and non-appropriated fund positions, whether they are GS or WG:

1. The duties of the position provide immediate and continuing support for combat operations or are to support maintenance and repair of combat essential systems of the armed forces;

2. The employee must perform those duties in a combat zone after the evacuation of non-essential personnel (including any dependents of members of the armed forces) from the combat zone in connection with a war, a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, or the commencement of combat operations of the armed forces in the zone; and

3. It is impracticable to convert the employee's position to a position authorized to be filled by a member of the armed forces because of a necessity for that duty to be performed without interruption.

DoD Directive 1404.10 ("Emergency Essential (E-E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees") requires positions that meet the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 1580 to be designated as emergency essential, and requires documentation of the designation within the position descriptions for the positions. The directive further requires emergency essential positions to be coded in automated civilian personnel records and reported quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

The authority provided under 5 U.S.C. 1580 and the DoD implementing policy under DoD 1404.10 accounts for deployment to combat zones. However, the Department deploys DoD civilians to support combat, contingency and emergency operations throughout the world, whether or not their positions are designated as emergency essential. Such employees generally are employee volunteers and typically serve in a temporary duty (TDY) status.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the PRT experience in Iraq informing DOD's work in developing stability operations capabilities under DOD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction," which gives stability operations priority comparable to combat operations?

Colonel BAKER. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq are a key civil-military adaptation the Department is examining in its implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 and its support to the State Department-led effort to implement NSPD-44 "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization" across the U.S. Government.

Both DoD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD-44 focus on improving civil-military integration. PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many agencies and

working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity. DoD aims to take the best from that tool set in order to build even more effective civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with that supporting role in mind while recognizing the military may be required to perform certain missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. You stated that the ePRTs are successful. Do the Departments of Defense and State have a plan to convert the initial 10 PRTs to ePRTs?

Colonel BAKER. PRT operations are dynamic and adjustments are continually being made to adapt to conditions on the ground. We are also applying lessons learned to ensure PRTs are serving our strategic objectives. At present, there is no plan to restructure existing PRTs into ePRTs. In fact, we are bolstering PRT capabilities by increasing staffing and augmenting subject matter experts to address local requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. Please describe a PST and explain how it operates in provinces that have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). How large is a PST? What skill-sets are represented on PSTs? Who is in command or in the lead of the PST?

Colonel BAKER. A PST is a small team of advisors who provide advice to provincial officials but for security and logistical reasons are not based in the province with which they work. PSTs that cover Karbala and Najaf operate from Al-Hillah, PSTs for Maysan and Muthana operate from Tallil in Dhi Qar province, and PSTs for Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah operate from Erbil. We are examining converting as many PSTs to PRTs as possible.

PSTs that operate in provinces that have been transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) have had no major change in their operations. PSTs are smaller than a PRT by design, and six of seven PSTs already operate in provinces that have PIC'd because these provinces are doing relatively well in governing capacity and economic development.

The number of people in a PST varies from one to nine people, depending on conditions and the scope of the PST's responsibilities.

The skill sets on PSTs are tailored to meet local needs. Like PRTs, PSTs may include specialists in public diplomacy, governance, agriculture, public health, city management, urban planning, cultural heritage, rule of law, economic development, public finance, business development, industrial management, and budget planning and execution.

Like PRTs, PSTs are led by Foreign Service Officers.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there an overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the State Department and other agencies? Should there be? Who attends the PCC meetings on PRTs for DOD?

Colonel BAKER. There is no overall PRT coordinator within DOD to interface with the State Department and other agencies. Rather, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), the Joint Staff (JS) Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1) and Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and the Navy N3/5 are the main offices that coordinate policy, training and manning issues for PRTs within DoD.

More specifically, the USD-P is assisted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA) through its Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East (ME)/Iraq office on day to day issues in Iraq and by the ASD for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities on the future of PRT like concepts. Both offices work closely with the DUSD (P&R) and the JS/J1 and J5. This arrangement allows different offices to apply their given expertise (country specific, future concepts, training and manning) for PRTs in Iraq.

The DOD representatives that attend the PCC meetings on PRTs for Iraq are from the offices of the ASD (ISA)/DASD—ME/Iraq and the JCS/J5.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DOD need more civil affairs teams? Please describe the difference between the civil affairs mission/operations and the PRT mission/operations.

Colonel BAKER. DOD is planning to increase the number of civil affairs (CA) teams. The CA force in the U.S. Army Reserves is programmed to grow from 64 CA companies in FY07 to a total of 112 CA companies in FY11. The active component CA force will concurrently grow from 6 CA companies in FY06 to 16 CA companies in FY09. Further, the U.S. Army is currently investigating whether additional CA force structure is required.

PRTs work closely with host-nation government agencies, external government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Depending on the needs of the individual province, the teams may be manned by personnel from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, MNF-I, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, and representatives from Coalition partners.

Compared to traditional CA units, PRTs often have a higher level of expertise from a variety of sources led by civilian officers. CA units are designated to support a military combat formation and CA units often focus their efforts at a lower level of government than does a PRT. Additionally, CA units will often work in areas deemed too dangerous for a PRT to freely operate.

Dr. SNYDER. What happens to the PRTs when a province goes to Provincial Iraqi Control? What happens to PRTs when U.S. combat forces transition to tactical overwatch? Operational overwatch? Strategic overwatch?

Colonel BAKER. Currently, two PRTs are serving in provinces that have experienced Provincial Iraq Control—those in Dhi Qar and Irbil. In both cases, the PRTs have continued to provide the same level of service to their provincial councils that they provided before PIC. PRTs are not permanent structures. As key legislation, such as the provincial powers law, is passed and provinces hold local elections, the provinces capacity to govern will grow. As this occurs, it is envisioned that the PRTs will, over time, be no longer needed in Iraq.

The issue of what will happen to PRTs in provinces when U.S. forces transition is currently under assessment by MNF-I. As directed by the President, MNF-I is currently revising the Joint Campaign Plan. This document will reflect comprehensive operational adjustments to keep in step with the drawdown of U.S. forces from 20 to 15 Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams (BCT/RCT) that begins in December 2007.

Until the revised Campaign Plan is approved and published, it would be premature to accurately answer the remaining questions about overwatch.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the work of the PRTs in Iraq support larger campaign plans and strategies? What measurable gains toward fulfillment of the overall strategies/campaign objectives have been made as the result of the PRT program?

General KIMMITT. The work of PRTs in Iraq supports the New Way Forward Strategy and the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP), written in concert by MNF-I and the US Embassy. The essence of the PRT mission is to coach, train and mentor provincial, district and municipal governments to increase their capacity to govern and deliver essential services and to assist in developing local economies. This effort supports the JCP and its strategic objectives.

One key area where PRTs have focused their efforts to fulfill the broader strategy in Iraq is budget development and execution. Effective budget development and execution helps increase the ability of local governments to provide services for their citizens, increases coordination and interaction between central and local governments, and builds management, planning, and leadership skills for government officials.

Through the Local Governance Program, PRTs have trained 2,000 council members, 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general and key staff in 380 departments to manage and execute budgets throughout Iraqi provincial ministries. In turn, Provincial Councils are improving their ability to plan and execute budgets. For example, by the end of 2006, provinces had committed only 49% of their calendar year budget funds. To date, according to PRT data, provinces have already committed 60% of their 2007 budget funds.

Provincial Councils are also increasing their ability to conduct long term planning and development and incorporate this into their budgets. For example, on October 10, 2007 the Baghdad Provincial Council's strategic planning committee completed its Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) and presented it to the Ministry of Planning. By coordinating how provincial and national governments create and spend their budgets over the coming years, the PDS is described by provincial officials as the most important mechanism connecting these governance entities. This was the result of a one-year-plus effort by provincial officials, working closely with PRT and USAID staff, who provided capacity development and technical assistance.

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Dr. SNYDER. Who in DOD is involved in the planning processes for PRTs? How is the planning overseen? How is execution and implementation measured and overseen? Who approves the PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans? How are PRTs (and PRT members) held accountable for the fulfillment of their work plans?

General KIMMITT. OSD-Policy, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and its subordinate units down to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)/Regimental Combat Team (RCT) level, are involved in the PRT planning process. BCT Commanders co-author civil-military plans with their ePRTs that are approved by MNC-I. In its campaign planning and execution, MNF-I works with the Embassy Team and the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) on PRT planning. OSD-P and Joint Staff J1 and J5 action officers attend regular working group and sub-working group meetings in Washington D.C. on PRTs.

OSD-Policy, Joint Staff J1 and J5 and Navy worked together with the State Department to plan and oversee the surge ePRT manning process when the President announced the New Way Forward Strategy in January 2007. This effort culminated in a memorandum of agreement between the departments on ePRT manning and backfill.

On behalf of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, OPA approves PRT work plans and monitors progress against the work plans. Through a steering group, OPA consults closely with the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO), USAID, the interagency Rule of Law working group, the embassy's Political, Political/Military and Economic sections, and with MNF-I and MNC-I on work plans, their progress, and planning for the future of PRTs.

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General KIMMITT. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in the post-conflict environment. A PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments, usually following open hostilities but can be used before, during and after hostilities if necessary. Per Joint Staff (J1) the mission is specifically tailored for Civil Affairs (CA) along with Reserve and National Guard personnel who bring their civilian skills and knowledge to the reconstruction effort. PRTs do not require new force structure but do require additional training and education of the CA units and attached members to inform them of the environment in which they operate.

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Both DoD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 focus on improving civil-military integration. PRTs serve as a critical model for integrating the programs of many agencies and working with local populations to meet immediate needs and build their capacity. DoD aims to take the best from that tool set in order to build even more effective civil-military teams that can respond to a variety of contingencies in the future.

A key step in improving civil-military coordination is to define appropriate roles for USG agencies and derive from that the capabilities required to fill those responsibilities. Experiences with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of civilian expertise in stability operations and the supporting role that the military plays in such missions. DoD is developing its capabilities with that supporting role in mind while recognizing the military may be required to perform certain missions if increases in current civilian capacity are not realized.

Dr. SNYDER. You stated that the ePRTs are successful. Do the Departments of Defense and State have a plan to convert the initial 10 PRTs to ePRTs?

General KIMMITT. At present, there is no plan to restructure existing PRTs into ePRTs. We are bolstering PRT capabilities by increasing staffing and augmenting subject matter experts to address local requirements. PRTs work closely with the Multi-National Divisions (MNDs), Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) and the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)/Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) in the provinces where they operate.

PRT operations are dynamic. Adjustments are continually being made to adapt to conditions on the ground. We have an active program to apply lessons learned to ensure PRTs are serving our strategic objectives.

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PRTs work closely with host-nation government agencies, external government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Depending on the needs of the individual province, the teams may be manned by personnel from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, MNF-I, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, and representatives from Coalition partners.

Compared to traditional CA units, PRTs often have a higher level of expertise from a variety of sources led by civilian officers. CA units are designated to support a military combat formation and CA units often focus their efforts at a lower level of government than does a PRT. Additionally, CA units will often work in areas deemed too dangerous for a PRT to freely operate.

Dr. SNYDER. What happens to the PRTs when a province goes to Provincial Iraqi Control? What happens to PRTs when U.S. combat forces transition to tactical overwatch? Operational overwatch? Strategic overwatch?

General KIMMITT. Currently, two PRTs are serving in provinces that have transitioned to Provincial Iraq Control—those in Dhi Qar and Irbil. In both cases, the PRTs have continued to provide the same level of service to their provincial councils that they provided before PIC. PRTs are not permanent structures. As key legislation, such as the provincial powers law, is passed and provinces hold local elections, the provinces' capacity to govern will grow. As this occurs, it is envisioned that the PRTs will, over time, be no longer needed in Iraq.

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Until the revised JCP is approved and published, it would be premature to answer the remaining questions on overwatch.

